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Comment
Reviewing the Impact of the Supreme Court’s
Interpretation of “Social Media” as Applied to OffCampus Student Speech
Katherine A. Ferry*
The Internet and social media have a profound impact on society as a
whole, but especially on teenagers. As technology continues to evolve,
and more people gain access to social media, online speech will only
serve to enhance the ways in which students engage and communicate.
Inevitably, problems continue to arise; specifically, how much schools
curtail students’ First Amendment rights to maintain a productive
educational environment. The Supreme Court articulated that students
have First Amendment rights in the schoolhouse in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District, but the Court has not faced the
issue of whether speech occurring off-campus is afforded the same
protection. The federal appellate courts have applied Tinker and its
progeny to off-campus speech, but distorted the framework, leading to
inconsistent First Amendment protection. However, the Supreme Court
recently held social media garners First Amendment protection in
Packingham v. North Carolina.
This Comment explores the Supreme Court’s holdings on student
speech and social media, and ultimately argues for school districts to
implement their own policies regarding off-campus speech until the
Supreme Court provides guidance. It will first explore the seminal
Supreme Court cases on school speech and the federal appellate courts’
split. Then, it examines the Supreme Court’s holdings regarding the
Internet and social media. Next, it will analyze the multiple tests applied
by the federal appellate courts and critique individual school social
media policies. It concludes by recommending a model framework for
schools to use while drafting individual social media policies.

* J.D. Candidate, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, 2019.
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INTRODUCTION
The Internet is one of the most important channels for the exchange of
views, revolutionizing the means for citizens to communicate, debate,
and engage with one another.1 The Internet drives the stock market,
shapes elections, and enhances education in the United States.2 While the
Internet is widely used and available to all age groups, teenagers report
using the Internet the most, facilitated by the convenience and efficiency
of smartphones.3 The majority of the time teenagers spend on the Internet
is on social networking websites; Facebook in particular, but 71 percent
of teenagers use more than one social networking site.4 As such, social
media has a profound impact on the secondary school setting.5
1. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (describing the Internet as the
most important place for the exercise of speech); Julie Seaman & David Sloan Wilson,
#FREESPEECH, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1013, 1014 (2016) (stating “[t]he magnitude of this recent
change in the pace, content, culture . . . of communication [on the Internet] is unprecedented in
human history”).
2. DARREN LILLEKER & NIGEL JACKSON, POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING, ELECTIONS AND THE
INTERNET: COMPARING THE US, UK, FRANCE, AND GERMANY 14–18 (Routledge 2011)
(highlighting the role the Internet plays in elections). See also Robert J. Shiller, How Stories Drive
the Stock Market, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/upshot/howstories-drive-the-stock-market.html (discussing the stock market fluctuations due to breaking
news).
3. Amanda Lehnhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/teens-social-media-technology2015/; Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 12, 2017),
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/ (comparing social media use by age group
and providing statistics on teenagers’ social media use that indicate 92 percent of teens report going
online daily compared with only 73 percent of adults). See also Christina Nguyen, Monitoring Your
Teenagers’ Online Activity: Why Consent or Disclosure Should Be Required, 15 SEATTLE J. SOC.
JUST. 261, 267–70 (2016) (discussing how access to the Internet has increased among teenagers in
recent years).
4. Lehnhart, supra note 3; Social Media Fact Sheet, supra note 3.
5. See Alana Nunez-Garcia, How Much Does Social Media Affect High School Students?, L.A.
TIMES HIGH SCHOOL INSIDER (June 17, 2016), http://highschool.latimes.com/saint-joseph-highschool/how-much-does-social-media-affect-high-school-students/ (explaining research conducted
on high school students’ opinions of the interplay between social media and education). See PBS
NewsHour: Schools are Watching Students’ Social Media, Raising Questions About Free Speech,
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The First Amendment provides a constitutional protection for speech,
but its interplay with social media remains undefined. This is especially
problematic considering the impact of social media on society. 6 However,
the Supreme Court recently provided clarity in Packingham v. North
Carolina, in which it extended First Amendment protection to social
media.7 Packingham presented the question of when social media use can
be restricted, striking down a North Carolina statute that prohibited sex
offenders from accessing social networking sites.8 Most importantly,
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, equated the Internet to a public
park, and reasoned that because cyberspace is the most important place
for the exchange of views, blanket restrictions on social media cannot
stand.9 Certainly this protection extends to adults, but how does the
holding in Packingham extend to students in the school setting?10
Legal issues concerning students’ free speech rights have been around
for decades.11 The Supreme Court’s pronouncement of a student’s right
to speak freely in school dates back to 1969 when, in Tinker v. Des
Moines, the Court affirmed students’ constitutional right to free speech
while on school grounds.12 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have
PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE (June 20, 2017) (interviewing high school students about their
relationship with social media).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Geoffrey R. Stone, Privacy, the First Amendment, and the Internet,
in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION (Saul Levmore & Martha C.
Nussbaum eds., Harvard Univ. Press 2010) (discussing First Amendment questions stemming from
Internet usage).
7. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
8. Id.; see N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(a) (West 2017) (stating “it is unlawful for a sex
offender who is registered . . . to access a commercial social networking Web site”).
9. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737 (describing the Internet as “the modern public square”). For
more information on the impermissible blanket restriction on speech in Packingham, see infra Part
II.B.
10. See infra Part III.B (comparing school social media policies to the reasoning in Packingham
and concluding that the holding in Packingham should extend to students).
11. Stephanie Klupinski, Getting Past the Schoolhouse Gate: Rethinking Student Speech in the
Digital Age, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 617–26 (2010) (analyzing the history of student speech rights,
beginning with Tinker and ending with district court cases in 2010). See generally Erwin
Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse Gate: What’s
Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 529–34 (2000) (discussing the history of Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District and subsequent Supreme Court cases relating to
student speech).
12. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). In Tinker, the
Court fashioned the “substantial and material disruption” test to analyze school speech. See infra
Part I.A (discussing the substantial and material disruption standard). For one perspective on what
constitutes a substantial and material disruption, see Mitchell J. Waldman, What oral statement of
student is sufficiently disruptive so as to fall beyond protection of first amendment, 76 A.L.R. FED.
599 § 1 (1986) (discussing cases in which courts found a substantial and material disruption
present); see also Nancy Willard, Student Online Off-Campus Speech: Assessing “Substantial
Disruption”, 22 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 611, 620 (2012) (analyzing what constitutes a “substantial
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further clarified the restrictions and protections on student speech, but the
matter has not been before the high court since 2007.13 However, all of
these issues and subsequent restrictions on speech were enacted to
regulate speech occurring inside the schoolhouse, leaving the protection
of speech made outside school grounds open to debate.14 Additionally
complicating the matter, the Supreme Court has been silent on the issue.15
While most juveniles’ Internet and social media usage occurs outside
of school, it can and often does ends up impacting the school
community.16 As such, there has recently been a trend of school
discipline stemming from student conduct on social media.17 For
example, the senior class president at Heights High School, Wesley
Teague, was suspended for the remainder of the school year after
comparing the school’s football team to a notoriously bad college football
team on Twitter.18 School officials claimed Teague intended to cause a
disruption”).
13. See generally Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (barring student speech that
advocates illegal activity). See also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)
(allowing schools to discipline school-sponsored speech); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (allowing school administrators authority to discipline lewd speech).
14. See Alison Hofheimer, Saved by the Bell? Is Online, Off-Campus Student Speech Protected
by the First Amendment?, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 971, 984 (2013) (discussing whether schools can
punish off-campus speech and to what end). See generally Caitlin May, “Internet-Savvy Students”
and Bewildered Educators: Student Internet Speech is Creating New Legal Issues for the
Educational Community, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 1105 (2009) (discussing the implications of reaching
into students’ homes to punish off-campus speech).
15. Carolyn Schurr Levin, Legal Analysis: How far can schools go in limiting student speech
online?,
STUDENT
PRESS
LAW
CENTER
(June
6,
2016,
10:49
AM),
http://www.splc.org/article/2016/06/legal-analysis-student-speech (stating that “[b]ecause the
United States Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the First Amendment implications of off
campus student speech on social media and elsewhere on the internet, a definitive rule is hard, if
not impossible, to enunciate”). See Elizabeth A. Shaver, Denying Certiorari in Bell v. Itawamba
County School Board: A Missed Opportunity to Clarify Students’ First Amendment Rights in the
Digital Age, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1539, 1573 (2016) (discussing the problem posed by the Court of
not addressing off-campus speech).
16. Abhishek Karadkar, The Impact of Social Media on Student Life, TECHNICIAN (Sept. 13,
2015),
http://www.technicianonline.com/opinion/article_d1142b70-5a92-11e5-86b4cb7c98a6e45f.html. See The Internet, Free Speech, and Schools, NATIONAL ASS’N OF INDEP.
SCHS. (2013), https://www.nais.org/magazine/independent-school/winter-2013/the-internet,-freespeech,-and-schools/ (providing background on the effects of social media on students and
schools).
17. For a synopsis of examples of student suspensions relating to conduct on social media, see
Benjamin Herold, 10 Social Media Controversies That Landed Students in Trouble This School
Year, EDUCATION WEEK (July 6, 2017), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2017/06/29/10social-media-controversies-that-landed-students-in-trouble.html.
18. Watch What You Tweet: Schools, Censorship, and Social Media, NATIONAL COALITION
AGAINST CENSORSHIP, http://ncac.org/watch-what-you-tweet-schools-censorship-and-socialmedia [hereinafter Watch What You Tweet]; Rebecca Klein, Wesley Teague, Kansas Student,
Suspended After Tweeting About His High School Sports Program, HUFFINGTON POST (May 9,
2013, 8:27 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/09/wesley-teague-suspended-twitter-
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disturbance and forbid him from giving the commencement speech at
graduation.19 In 2012, a high school student created an anti-bullying
video to raise awareness of the harmful effects of bullying. 20 Once school
officials caught wind, she was subsequently suspended because her
speech posed a disruption in school.21 Moreover, students can be
suspended for simply ‘liking’ or ‘retweeting’ another person’s content.22
When these cases make it to court, there is little guidance as to how
they should be interpreted and what precedent, if any, should apply to the
off-campus speech.23 In the absence of clear guidance from the Supreme
Court, the federal appellate courts have developed several of their own
tests to determine if a school has the authority to regulate off-campus
speech.24 Because of this inconsistency, there is currently an unequal
application of the First Amendment to students’ rights, which results in
students’ geographical location having a large impact on whether their
speech will be protected.25 To avoid this, school districts should fashion
policies that promote safety while still protecting the constitutional rights
of students in the Internet age.26 Packingham, while not related to student
tweet-sports_n_3248326.html.
19. Watch What You Tweet, supra note 18.
20. Id.; Long Island Girl Suspended Over Anti-Bullying YouTube Video, CBS NEW YORK (May
22, 2012, 7:29 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2012/05/22/l-i-girl-suspended-over-antibullying-youtube-video/.
21. Watch What You Tweet, supra note 18; Kery Murakami, Jessica Barba back to school after
suspension, NEWSDAY (May 24, 2012, 10:17 PM), https://www.newsday.com/longisland/suffolk/jessica-barba-back-to-school-after-suspension-1.3737937.
22. Watch What You Tweet, supra note 18; Rebecca Klein, 20 High Schoolers Suspended for
Retweeting
Gossip,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Mar.
18,
2014,
9:55
AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/18/mckay-high-school-retweets_n_4981878.html.
23. Hofheimer, supra note 14, at 987. See Daniel Marcus-Toll, Tinker Gone Viral: Diverging
Threshold Tests for Analyzing School Regulation of Off-Campus Digital Student Speech, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 3395, 3423 (2014) (discussing the circuit courts’ conflicting ideas of what
precedent governs off-campus student speech cases).
24. See John T. Ceglia, The Disappearing Schoolhouse Gate: Applying Tinker in the Internet
Age, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 939, 941 (2013) (stating Tinker is the federal courts of appeals’ preferred
mode of analysis); Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3423 (discussing the circuit courts’ use of Tinker
to analyze regulation of off-campus student speech); Rory Allen Weeks, The First Amendment,
Public School Student, and the Need for Clear Limits on School Officials’ Authority Over OffCampus Student Speech, 46 GA. L. REV. 1157, 1182 (2012) (discussing the issues resulting from
the federal appellate courts’ circuit split).
25. See Samantha M. Levin, School Districts As Weathermen: The School’s Ability To
Reasonably Forecast Substantial Disruption to the School Environment From Students’ Online
Speech, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 859, 861 (2011) (arguing that Tinker thresholds result in an
impermissible inconsistency for students’ First Amendment rights); see also infra, Part III.A
(analyzing the impact the different threshold tests have on students’ First Amendment rights).
26. See Benjamin L. Ellison, More Connection, Less Protection? Off-Campus Speech with OnCampus Impact, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 809, 842 (2010) (suggesting that a student’s intent for
speech to reach campus should be included as a factor in assisting schools in determining whether
to discipline a student for off-campus speech that disrupts the school environment). See infra Part
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speech, provides important insight as to how schools can create social
media policies that are constitutional while still maintaining order and
safety in the schoolhouse.27
In Part I, this Comment will provide the background of the Supreme
Court student speech cases, the individual tests the Court incorporated to
address these issues, and the approaches federal appellate courts have
undertaken as a result.28 Part II will then discuss the Supreme Court’s
rulings concerning social media, specifically the reasoning set forth in
Reno v. ACLU and Packingham, in which the Court held the Internet and
social media are protected forms of speech.29 Next, Part III will analyze
the implications resulting from the differing threshold tests and individual
school social media policies, as well as the “chilling effect” of this
inconsistency.30 Lastly, Part IV will propose a framework for schools to
follow when crafting social media policies that adheres to both Supreme
Court precedent and the federal appellate courts’ approaches.31
I. BACKGROUND
This Part begins by discussing the Supreme Court’s holding and
reasoning in the seminal case on student speech rights, Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District.32 It then examines
subsequent Supreme Court cases that limited students’ speech rights in
schools.33 This Part then explains the “true threat” doctrine, which can be
used to restrict certain types of student speech.34 Next, this Part analyzes
the federal appellate courts’ approaches to examining the regulation of
off-campus student speech.35 Finally, it presents examples of off-campus
IV (providing a model threshold test for schools to implement while drafting policies pertaining to
social media).
27. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–38 (2017) (holding social media is
protected speech). See infra Part III (discussing how Packingham can apply to student speech).
28. See infra Part I (providing background on the seminal Supreme Court cases on student
speech, the tests employed by the Court, and the federal appellate courts’ circuit split).
29. See infra Part II (discussing the Supreme Court cases pertaining to the Internet and contentbased and content-neutral regulations).
30. See infra Part III (analyzing the inconsistent application of students’ First Amendment rights
due to the conflicting threshold tests undertaken by the federal appellate courts, critiquing school
social media policies, and examining the chilling effect from these inconsistencies).
31. See infra Part IV (proposing a model policy for schools to implement using elements
articulated by the Supreme Court cases as well as the federal appellate courts).
32. See infra Part I.A (discussing the reasoning and tests set forth in Tinker).
33. See infra Part I.B (examining student speech cases subsequent to Tinker—Fraser,
Kuhlmeier, and Morse—and discussing the tests and reasoning employed by the Supreme Court in
each case).
34. See infra Part I.C (analyzing the history and meaning of the “true threat” doctrine as applied
to student speech).
35. See infra Part I.D (discussing cases pertaining to off-campus student speech and tests for
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social media use policies enacted by various school districts.36
A. Tinker Revolutionizes Students’ Speech Rights
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of student speech in 1969 in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.37 Tinker
is among the most important cases involving students’ constitutional
rights, and the first to announce that students enjoy First Amendment
protection while in school.38 In December 1965, a group of students in
Des Moines, Iowa, agreed they would wear black armbands to school as
a public showing of their support for a truce in the Vietnam War.39 When
the school principals learned of the plan, they created a policy that stated
any student wearing an armband would be asked to remove it, and refusal
to do so would result in suspension.40 The students refused to remove the
armbands and were subsequently suspended. In response, the students
sued the school district for a violation of their First Amendment rights.41
The District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, Central Division,
dismissed the complaint and the students appealed.42 The Court of
each federal court of appeals).
36. See infra Part I.E (discussing the school districts’ policies regarding off-campus social
media usage).
37. 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). Justice Abe Fortas delivered the opinion for a 7-2 majority, with
concurring opinions by Justice Stewart and Justice White, and dissenting opinions by Justice Black
and Justice Harlan. See generally JOHN W. JOHNSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR STUDENT RIGHTS:
TINKER V. DES MOINES AND THE 1960S (Univ. Press of Kansas 1997) (discussing the historical
background during the time period Tinker was litigated).
38. Richard Gyory, The Constitutional Rights of Public School Pupils, 40 FORDHAM L. REV.
201, 204 (1971) (stating “Tinker was the first unambiguous assertion by the Supreme Court of the
constitutional rights of school children”). See generally Jill H. Krafte, Tinker’s Legacy: Freedom
of the Press in Public High Schools, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 387 (1979) (discussing the impact the
holding in Tinker had on public school students in 1969).
39. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
40. Id.; Brief for Petitioners at 8, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (No. 21), 1968 WL 112602, at *3–4:
At this meeting, a policy prohibiting the wearing of arm bands in school was adopted by
the principals, who decided that a student wearing an arm band to school would be asked
to remove it, and that if the student refused he would be suspended but allowed to return
without the arm band.
41. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
42. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971, 973 (S.D. Iowa 1966).
Chief Judge Stephenson delivered the opinion, holding that school officials must be given wide
discretion to discipline students when there is a substantial interference to the rest of the school.
The court provided substantial discussion on the effects of the Vietnam War, noting that the conflict
“had become vehement in many localities.” Tinker, 258 F. Supp. at 973. See Jon G. Crawford,
When Student Off-Campus Cyberspeech Permeates the Schoolhouse Gate: Are There Limits to
Tinker’s Reach?, 45 URB. LAW. 235, 238 n.22 (2013) (“The court also acknowledged the
contentious nature of the debate had been demonstrated during the school board’s hearing on the
students’ suspensions. These facts were part of the calculus involved in the district court’s
conclusion school officials had acted reasonably” when they prohibited wearing of arm bands).
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Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered the case en banc and affirmed
without opinion.43
Supreme Court Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, famously
declared that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”44 The Court found that
because the students’ armbands did not cause any disorder in the school
and the armbands represented a political opinion, the school could not
curtail the students’ First Amendment rights.45 However, the Court made
clear that students’ free speech rights are not absolute while present on
school grounds.46 Under Tinker, a school may restrict student speech
when it materially and substantially disrupts the school environment or
invades the rights of others.47 Importantly, the Court articulated that a
school could regulate student speech in anticipation of a material and
substantial disruption.48 But, mere apprehension of a disturbance or
undifferentiated fear is not enough to justify discipline.49 Following
Tinker, subsequent Supreme Court decisions created limits that further
narrowed the scope of students’ rights.50

43. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 383 F.2d 988, 988 (8th Cir. 1967). The Eighth
Circuit was evenly divided. The case was argued before the Supreme Court on November 12, 1968,
and the decision was delivered on February 24, 1969. Advocating for the plaintiffs, Dan Johnston
declared during oral argument: “It’s important that the idea of freedom of dissent and inquiry and
expression be maintained in the schools.” Oral Argument at 16:40, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (No. 21), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1968/21.
44. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
45. Id. at 507–08.
46. Id. at 513 (holding student speech rights are important, but when student speech
substantially interferes with the school it is “not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech”).
47. Id. See Bonnie Kellman, Tinkering with Tinker: Protecting the First Amendment in Public
Schools, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 367, 376–84 (2009) (discussing the reasoning in Tinker and
dissecting the material and substantial disruption test).
48. [O]ur independent examination of the record fails to yield evidence that the school
authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would substantially
interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students. Even an
official memorandum prepared after the suspension that listed the reasons for the ban on
wearing the armbands made no reference to the anticipation of such disruption.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
49. Id. at 508. See Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 533 (“Mere fear of disruption is not enough.
The burden is on the school to prove the need for restricting student speech and the standard is a
stringent one: there must be enough proof that the speech would ‘materially and substantially’
disrupt the school.”).
50. See Scott A. Moss, The Overhyped Path from Tinker to Morse: How the Student Speech
Cases Show the Limits of Supreme Court Decisions – for the Law and for the Litigants, 63 FLA. L.
REV. 1407, 1423 (2011) (discussing the limiting trend of student speech rights from Tinker to
Morse); see also infra Part I.B (discussing the limits placed on protection of student speech
subsequent to Tinker).
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B. Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse Set Additional Limits on Student
Speech
In Bethel School District v. Fraser, the Supreme Court ruled that
schools could prohibit speech that was considered vulgar, lewd, or plainly
offensive because such speech was inconsistent with the fundamental
values of public school education.51 In Fraser, a high school student
delivered a vulgar speech during an assembly in which approximately
600 students were present.52 The Court distinguished this speech from
the speech in Tinker, holding that the penalties imposed in this case were
unrelated to any political viewpoint.53 Chief Justice Burger, writing for
the majority, emphasized language from Justice Black’s dissent in Tinker,
which rejected the notion that the Constitution compels school authorities
to surrender control of the school to the students.54 While the Court
affirmed the student’s punishment, Justice Brennan, in a concurring
opinion, explained that if the student had delivered the same speech
outside the school, he could not be penalized just because government
officials considered his language to be inappropriate.55 This set forth the
idea that schools do not have the authority to punish speech occurring offcampus; however, some courts in subsequent years have not adhered to
this viewpoint and instead upheld punishments for off-campus speech
that officials found inappropriate.56
Following Fraser, in 1988, the Court addressed whether a school could
censor or prohibit student newspaper articles discussing controversial
topics in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.57 The Court held that
51. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
52. Id. at 677. The assembly was part of a “school-sponsored educational program in selfgovernment” in which Fraser referred to his favored candidate in terms of an “elaborate, graphic
and explicit sexual metaphor.” Id. at 677–78. Fraser gave the following speech:
I know a man who is firm – he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character is
firm – but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman
is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll take an issue and nail it
to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts – he drives hard, pushing and pushing until
finally – he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end – even the climax, for
each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president—he’ll never come
between you and the best our high school can be.
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 685.
54. Id. at 686 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526 (Black, J., dissenting)).
55. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring). See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26
(1971) (holding that a California criminal statute which prohibited disturbance of the peace by
offensive conduct was inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth amendments, even if the public
display or speech involved was immoral and offensive).
56. See infra Part I.D (discussing cases when schools have limited speech occurring outside the
schoolhouse gate).
57. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988). The articles that were
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the First Amendment does not require a school to relinquish control over
content in a school-sponsored publication, so long as the school’s actions
are “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”58 The Court
granted school officials the authority to censor speech when it could be
reasonably inferred from the circumstances that parents and members of
the public would consider the speech a product of the school itself.59 As
the Court put another limit on the Tinker test, Justice Brennan’s dissent
argued the majority’s holding created a classification of school
censorship allowing heightened scrutiny for one category of speech but
not another.60 Emphasizing the lack of consistency in student speech
jurisprudence, the dissent advocated for Tinker to be applied across the
board to preserve the sanctity of good precedent, while foreshadowing
the lack of consistency that would plague future student speech cases.61
The Court remained silent on student speech until 2007, when it
decided Morse v. Frederick.62 Morse presented the question of whether
schools could punish a student for speech promoting illegal drug use at
an off-campus, school-sponsored activity.63 In Morse, a high school in
Alaska suspended a student for waving a banner reading “Bong Hits 4
censored dealt with three students’ experiences with pregnancy and the impact of divorce on
students at the school. Id. at 263.
58. Id. at 273. For a thorough discussion on the reasoning in Kuhlmeier, see Bruce C. Hafen,
Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J. 685
(1988) (analyzing the Court’s decision in Kuhlmeier that the First Amendment permits educators
to supervise student newspapers).
59. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 276 (applying the Tinker substantial disruption test and noting that
since a school newspaper is a public forum and produced from the schools’ resources, censorship
could be justified to prevent substantial disruption of the school or violations of the law).
60. Id. at 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting):
On the one hand is censorship “to silence a student’s personal expression that happens
to occur on the school premises” . . . [o]n the other hand is censorship of expression that
arises in the context of “school-sponsored . . . expressive activities that students, parents,
and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school.”
See Scott Andrew Felder, Stop the Presses: Censorship and the High School Journalist, 29 J.L. &
EDUC. 433, 446 (2000) (“It has been suggested that censorship could never be reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns because censorship itself is an educationally unsound
practice.”).
61. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 283–84. See May, supra note 14, at 1110 (stating that Justice
Brennan’s dissenting argument “highlights how the Court’s subsequent cases, rather than
reaffirming Tinker, merely crafted new exceptions or categories of analysis for student speech”);
Brannon P. Denning & Molly C. Taylor, Morse v. Frederick and the Regulation of Student
Cyberspeech, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 835, 840 (2008) (“Commentators generally hailed Tinker,
and deplored what they saw as narrowing of it by Fraser and Kuhlmeier.”).
62. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007). See Shannon L. Noder, Comment, Morse v.
Frederick: Students’ First Amendment Rights Restricted Again, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 859 (2009)
(analyzing the facts, holding, reasoning, and impact of Morse).
63. Morse, 551 U.S. at 400.

728

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 49

Jesus” during a school-sponsored event on the basis that promoting illegal
drug use was against school policy.64 Despite the event occurring offcampus, the Court held that because it happened during school hours at a
school-sanctioned event, it fell within the school’s scope of authority. 65
The Court reiterated that the Tinker analysis is not absolute, limiting
its application to speech that expresses fear, disturbance, or an unpopular
viewpoint; therefore, Tinker did not apply to the speech at issue, which
posed a more serious societal danger.66 Moreover, the Court reasoned that
Fraser was inapplicable, implying that the category of speech that falls
under a Fraser analysis includes only lewd, inappropriate, or sexually
suggestive speech during school hours.67 Kuhlmeier also did not apply
because it was unreasonable to suggest that the school supported the
display of the banner.68 Morse, therefore, expanded schools’ authority to
regulate speech that promotes illegal activity when it occurs off-campus,
but at a school-sponsored event.69 The Supreme Court has not heard a
case regarding student speech since Morse.70
C. The “True Threat” Limitation on Student Speech
Tinker, Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse stand as the foundational
student speech cases, but courts have incorporated another analysis to
determine the limits of First Amendment protection of student speech that
occurs outside of school.71 The “true threat” doctrine was first articulated
64. Id. at 397–98.
65. Id. at 400–01; Melinda Cupps Dickler, The Morse Quartet: Student Speech and the First
Amendment, 53 LOY. L. REV. 355, 370–80 (2007) (analyzing the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions in Morse and each opinion’s reasoning).
66. Morse, 551 U.S. at 407–08 (explaining the drug abuse problem plaguing the nation’s youth
and describing how a Tinker analysis cannot apply to situations posing these grave dangers). See
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (holding that speech that
merely causes a fear of a substantial disruption is not enough to punish a student).
67. Morse, 551 U.S. at 405. See Denning & Taylor, supra note 61, at 861 (reviewing the Court’s
interpretation of Fraser in its decision in Morse).
68. Morse, 551 U.S. at 405–06.
69. Id. See Linda Greenhouse, Vote Against Banner Shows Divide on Speech in Schools, N.Y.
TIMES (June 26, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/26/washington/26speech.html
(critiquing the conflicting Court in Morse); Jason Harrow, Commentary on Morse v. Frederick,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2007, 2:10 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2007/06/commentary-onmorse-v-frederick/ (discussing the categories Chief Justice Roberts used in rendering his decision
in Morse, specifically noting that his opinion made sense as a matter of public policy, but failed to
make sense of the conflicting student speech holdings).
70. See Krafte, supra note 38, at 399 (stating Morse was the last student speech case on which
the Supreme Court ruled).
71. See infra Part I.C (discussing the “true threat” doctrine). See also The Editorial Board, What
is
a
True
Threat
on
Facebook?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
1,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/what-is-a-true-threat-on-facebook.html
(arguing
that what constitutes a true threat on Facebook is subjective).
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by the Supreme Court in 1969 in Watts v. United States, which held
threatening speech about the president was protected as political
speech.72 While the Court made clear that speech that amounts to a “true
threat” is outside the protection of the First Amendment, it failed to define
what speech constitutes a true threat.73
Justice O’Connor in Virginia v. Black interpreted Watts to encompass
statements threatening violence to a particular individual or group.74
Justice Alito in a dissenting opinion in Elonis v. United States defined a
“true threat” as a statement that expresses an intention to inflict evil,
injury, or damage on another.75 Thus, for speech to be considered a true
threat, one must purposely or knowingly communicate an intention to
inflict unlawful harm on a person or persons.76
The “true threat” doctrine, while not a bright-line rule, has been used
by courts to address student speech issues.77 However, the doctrine has
been split into two tests—the reasonable speaker test and the reasonable
recipient test.78 The reasonable speaker test looks at the level of intent
72. 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam); see Andrew P. Stanner, Toward an Improved True
Threat Doctrine for Student Speakers, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385, 390 (2006) (discussing Watts and
the beginning of the “true threat” doctrine).
73. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 283, 288 (2001):
The only Supreme Court case to elaborate on the true threats exception to the First
Amendment is United States v. Watts, which made clear that . . . “[w]hat is a threat must
be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.” However, the Supreme
Court did not provide a specific test for making this distinction.
74. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
75. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2014 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2382 (1976)).
76. Compare Black, 538 U.S. at 349 (providing Justice O’Connor’s definition of a true threat),
with Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2014 (Alito, J., dissenting) (providing Justice Alito’s definition of a true
threat).
77. See, e.g., Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004) (using a “true
threat” analysis to hold that a student’s drawing was protected speech under the First Amendment);
Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002) (using a “true threat”
analysis to uphold the expulsion of a student who threatened the life of his classmate);
Commonwealth v. Milo M., 740 N.E.2d 967 (Mass. 2001) (using a “true threat” analysis to uphold
disciplinary action of a 12-year-old student who drew a picture of shooting his teacher). For more
analysis and examples of cases in which a “true threat” analysis was used, see Stanner, supra note
72, at 390.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 185 (4th Cir. 2009) (applying an objective
test that considers whether a reasonable recipient familiar with the context would interpret the
statement as a threat); Porter, 393 F.3d at 617–18 (conducting the “true threat” analysis from the
recipient’s perspective, but ultimately not coming to a conclusion on the accuracy of a recipient- or
speaker-based test); United States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6, 14–15 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that
a true threat is one that a reasonable recipient familiar with the communication would find
threatening); Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622–23 (8th Cir. 2002) (using
the reasonable recipient standard); United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997)
(using the specific recipient and surrounding context to determine a true threat); United States v.
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from the speaker’s point of view.79 Under this test, the speaker must have
knowingly made a statement that expresses an intention to inflict harm
upon another.80 In contrast, the reasonable recipient test looks at the level
of intent from the listener’s point of view, asking if an ordinary recipient
who is familiar with the context of the statement would interpret it as a
threat.81
D. The Federal Appellate Courts’ Circuit Split: When, if Ever, Can
Schools Regulate Off-Campus Speech?
The federal appellate courts are split on how to analyze students’ First
Amendment rights when their speech occurs outside the schoolhouse.82
Absent a clear articulation and ruling from the Supreme Court, lower
courts have been left in the dark, and have inconsistently applied the
aforementioned tests to analyze the issue of off-campus speech.83 The
majority of federal appellate courts apply some variation of Tinker to
students’ off-campus speech, but differ in their applications and use of
the exceptions set forth in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse.84
The Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits apply the foreseeability
threshold to the Tinker test.85 The Third Circuit also applies the
foreseeability threshold to Tinker, but tweaks its test to focus on the
Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1994) (using a reasonable recipient familiar with the context
standard); United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1992) (looking to what the
reasonable person would conclude); United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th
Cir. 1990) (analyzing a true threat from the speaker’s perspective); United States v. Schneider, 910
F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying the reasonable recipient standard); United States v.
Welch, 745 F.2d 614, 619 (10th Cir. 1984) (using a reasonable speaker standard regarding
statements to the President of the United States).
79. Doe, 306 F.3d at 623.
80. United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991).
81. United States v. Masionet, 484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th Cir. 1973). While the true threat
jurisprudence is vast, this Comment focuses its discussion on “true threat” analysis used in student
speech cases. See infra Part IV (incorporating the “true threat” approach into a model school social
media policy).
82. See William Calve, Comment, The Amplified Need for Supreme Court Guidance on Student
Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 377, 386 (2016) (analyzing the circuit split
between federal appellate courts); Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3420 (dissecting the differing
approaches that result in inconsistent application of Tinker at the federal appellate level).
83. See Calve, supra note 82 at 386 (“Circuit courts have continuously invoked Tinker to
regulate off-campus cyberspeech, particularly when the speech is violent or threatening, but the
method of application is inconsistent across the country.”); infra Part III.A (discussing the impact
of the inconsistent Tinker threshold tests on students).
84. Compare Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying the
reasoning set forth in Kuhlmeier with a Tinker analysis), with Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist.,
728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasizing Tinker’s application when dealing with speech that is
illegal or threatening, as articulated in Morse).
85. See infra Parts I.D.1, 5, 6 (examining the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuit’s “reasonable
foreseeability” threshold).
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student’s intent.86 The Fourth Circuit applies a “sufficient nexus”
threshold to Tinker, while the Eleventh Circuit applies a “true threat” test,
in addition to a traditional Tinker analysis.87 The Ninth Circuit declines
to apply any of these approaches, and extends Tinker only when faced
with an identifiable threat of school violence,88 while the Fifth Circuit’s
approach is flexible to accommodate the specific facts before it.89 Absent
an express ruling from the Supreme Court, the lower courts will continue
to rule inconsistently.90
For example, while the Third Circuit’s “intent” threshold of its Tinker
analysis led to the conclusion that a student-created social media account
defaming the school’s principal was protected speech,91 the Fourth
Circuit’s “sufficient nexus” Tinker threshold led to the conclusion that a
student’s social media comments about a fellow student were outside
First Amendment protection.92 Both decisions were handed down in
2011, thus eliminating any variables related to societal interests or
viewpoints of the time that might explain such inconsistent rulings.93 The
next Section will break down the various circuits’ approaches in detail,
looking at case examples to better understand the discrepancies.94

86. See infra Part I.D.2 (discussing the Third Circuit’s intent approach). See also Layshock ex
rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2011) (using the intent precursor
to Tinker).
87. See infra Parts I.D.3, 8 (providing background information on the threshold tests the Fourth
Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit use, respectively). Compare Kowalski, 653 F.3d at 567 (using a
“sufficient nexus” threshold to Tinker), with Boim v. Fulton Cty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 985
(11th Cir. 2007) (approaching off-campus student speech cases using a traditional Tinker
approach).
88. See infra Part I.D.7 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s ‘faced with an identifiable threat of
violence’ approach); see also Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir.
2013) (articulating the Ninth Circuit’s test).
89. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 421 (5th Cir. 2015). See generally Shaver,
supra note 15, at 1573 (analyzing the approach by the Fifth Circuit in relation to the other circuits
and the need for Supreme Court guidance to combat this inconsistency).
90. Calve, supra note 82, at 383–84 (discussing the inconsistent approaches of the circuit
courts). This Comment focuses on student online speech, but for the purposes of identifying each
circuit’s approach to off-campus student speech, cases that do not address online speech specifically
are included to demonstrate the test that the circuits will potentially use to rule in student social
media cases.
91. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying a
Tinker analysis but focusing on the student’s intent).
92. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying a “sufficient
nexus” threshold test to Tinker).
93. Id.; Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920. For a look back on the big stories of 2011, see 2011: Year in
Review, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.latimes.com/la-2011-year-in-review-gallerystorygallery.html.
94. See infra Parts II.D.1–9 (examining the circuit court approaches and cases decided).
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1. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit incorporates an additional threshold into the Tinker
analysis to decide off-campus student speech cases.95 The court first
looks to see whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech will reach
school grounds, then applies Tinker to determine if the speech is likely to
cause a material and substantial disruption.96 The Second Circuit first
applied this test in 2007, in Wisniewski v. Board of Education of the
Weedsport Central School District.97 In Wisniewski, the court addressed
whether a student could be disciplined for sharing a drawing on his social
media profile suggesting a teacher be shot and killed.98 The court
expressly disaffirmed using the “true threat” approach to determine if
discipline was permissible, declaring that school administrators’
authority is beyond what the true threat standard allows.99 The court
announced that if off-campus conduct can create a foreseeable risk of
substantial disruption within a school, the school has the authority to
discipline the student.100
A year later, in Doninger v. Niehoff, the court addressed whether a
student could be disciplined for writing a blog post outside school hours
that degraded the school’s administration and encouraged peers to harass
them.101 The court used the reasoning set forth in Wisniewski to hold that
95. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ.
of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007). As illustrated by these two cases,
the Second Circuit uses a reasonable foreseeability threshold to decide off-campus student speech
cases.
96. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39 (“We have recognized that off-campus conduct can create a
foreseeable risk of substantial disruption within a school. . . .”) (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607
F.2d 1043, 1052 (2d Cir.1979)).
97. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 34.
98. Id. at 35. The eighth-grade student was using AOL Instant Messaging software on his
parents’ home computer. The software enables users to display an icon, serving as an identifier of
the sender of a message. The icon was the drawing at issue, which depicted a “pistol firing a bullet
at a person’s head, above which were dots representing splattered blood. Beneath the drawing
appeared the words ‘Kill Mr. VanderMolen.’” Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36.
99. Id. at 38. See Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2013); infra
Part I.D.7 (explaining the Ninth Circuit’s “identifiable violence” approach to decide a similar fact
pattern).
100. Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 39. The court used this reasoning from a footnote in a case decided
thirty years prior. In Thomas v. Board of Education, the court wrote “[w]e can, of course, envision
a case in which a group of students incites substantial disruption within the school from some
remote locale.” 607 F.2d 1043, 1052 n.17 (2d Cir. 1979).
101. 527 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2008). The blog post at issue is as follows:
jamfest is cancelled due to douchebags in central office. here is an email that we sent out
to a ton of people and asked them to forward to everyone in their address book to help
get support for jamfest. basically, because we sent it out, Paula Schwartz is getting a
TON of phone calls and emails and such. we have so much support and we really
appriciate [sic] it. however, she got pissed off and decided to just cancel the whole thing
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because the blog post directly pertained to a school-sponsored event and
encouraged other students to harass principals and teachers, it was
reasonably foreseeable that the student’s speech would reach the
school.102 The court then concluded that the speech caused a substantial
disruption, and thus was not entitled to First Amendment protection.103
The Second Circuit has not addressed off-campus speech since 2008.104
2. Third Circuit
While the Third Circuit also applies a Tinker approach to off-campus
speech, it tweaks the test and focuses on whether the student intended for
his or her speech to cause a disruption in the school.105 In J.S. ex rel.
Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, an eighth-grade student was
suspended after he created a fake social media account that ridiculed the
school’s principal.106 The Third Circuit held that Tinker could apply to
off-campus speech.107 In contrast with the Second Circuit’s approach, the
court looks to the student’s intent to determine whether it is reasonably
foreseeable that the speech would cause a substantial disruption in the
school.108 Adding yet another threshold to Tinker, the court noted that
because the student did not intend for the speech to reach the school, it
could not be reasonably foreseeable that her content would cause a

all together. anddd [sic] so basically we aren’t going to have it at all, but in the slightest
chance we do it is going to be after the talent show on may 18.
Id.
102. Id. at 348. See Allison E. Hayes, From Armbands to Douchebags: How Doninger v.
Niehoff Shows the Supreme Court Needs to Address Student Speech in the Cyber Age, 43 AKRON
L. REV. 247, 271 (2010) (analyzing the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Doninger).
103. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 49.
104. Although the Second Circuit has not addressed a similar case, and thus has not had the
opportunity to apply the reasonably foreseeable threshold to the Tinker test, the court ruled on a
student speech case in 2001. See generally R.O. ex rel. Oschorn v. Ithaca City Sch. Dist., 645 F.3d
533 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that under the exceptions to Tinker set forth in Fraser and Hazelwood,
the school acted reasonably in preventing the distribution of a school newspaper that contained
drawings of stick figures in sexual positions, qualifying as “lewd”).
105. Compare J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (applying an “intent” threshold to Tinker), with Doninger, 527 F.3d at 45 (applying a
“reasonably foreseeable” threshold to Tinker).
106. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920.
107. Id. at 927 (rejecting the argument that Tinker could not reach off-campus conduct). See
Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3423 (discussing the tests for off-campus student speech); First
Amendment – Student Speech – Third Circuit Applies Tinker to Off-Campus Student Speech. – J.S.
ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1064 (2012) (discussing the majority and dissenting opinions of Synder).
108. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 928. See Scott Dranoff, Tinker-ing with Speech Categories: Solving
the Off-Campus Student Speech Problem with a Categorical Approach and a Comprehensive
Framework, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 649, 659–61(2013) (discussing the “intent” approaches
analyzed by scholars and the federal appellate courts).
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substantial disruption.109 Although the court held that this speech could
not be subject to discipline, it warned of potential conflicting holdings
that would unduly restrict off-campus speech.110
On the same day Snyder was decided, the Third Circuit handed down
a similar holding in Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School
District.111 In Layshock, a student was disciplined for creating a social
media profile ridiculing the school’s principal.112 The court held that the
school did not have the authority to discipline the student because the
conduct occurred outside school hours, the student did not intend for the
speech to reach the school, and it was not foreseeable that the speech
would cause a material and substantial disruption.113 Additionally, the
court warned that schools may only punish expressive conduct that occurs
off-campus under very limited circumstances.114
3. Fourth Circuit
The approach taken by the Fourth Circuit incorporates an additional
threshold to decide off-campus student speech issues.115 In 2011, the
109. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 930 (noting the differences between the intentions of the students in
Doninger, Lowery, and LaVine compared to the intentions of the student in the case at bar. The
court wrote, “[she] did not intend for the speech to reach the school – in fact, she took specific steps
to make the profile “private” so that only her friends could access it”). See Doninger v. Niehoff,
527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that the student intended for the speech to reach the
schoolhouse); Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 599 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that the students
intended for the speech to reach the administration); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981,
985 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that the student’s intention was to cause a disruption in the school
because he showed his teacher a disturbing poem).
110. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 933 (stating “an opposite holding would significantly broaden school
districts’ authority over student speech”).
111. For more information regarding the procedural history of the Layshock and Snyder cases,
see Matthew Beatus, Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School District, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 785, 793 n.59 (2011–12) (stating “[b]ecause the cases were so factually similar and confusion
ensued, the Third Circuit vacated both opinions and held a rehearing of the consolidated cases en
banc on June 3, 2010. The Third Circuit published its opinions following the consolidated en banc
rehearing on June 13, 2011”).
112. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc). For a rendition of the facts in Layshock, see Beatus, supra note 111, at 790:
Layshock copied-and-pasted a picture of Trosch from the school district’s website for
use in the MySpace profile and falsely answered the survey questions that MySpace asks
when users are creating profiles. Some of the information that Layshock supplied in
creating the profile was as follows: “Birthday: too drunk to remember”; “Are you a
health freak: big steroid freak . . .”
113. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 213. In a concurring opinion, Judge Jordan argued that any offcampus speech that caused a substantial disruption is punishable, an issue which the majority did
not address. Id. at 219–20 (Jordan, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 219.
115. See Gyory, supra note 38, at 224–25 (discussing the different approaches the circuits take
in student speech cases). Compare Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 577 (4th Cir.
2011) (using a sufficient nexus test with the Tinker threshold), and Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d
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Fourth Circuit held in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools that the
school had authority to discipline a student who created a social media
web page to post hateful messages about a classmate.116 The court
introduced the “sufficient nexus” test, which addresses whether the offcampus conduct is sufficiently connected to the school’s pedagogical
interests to warrant disciplinary action.117 The court held that because the
student could have reasonably expected the speech to reach the school, as
a majority of the web page’s members were peers, the nexus between the
conduct and the school’s interests was sufficiently strong.118
4. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit first addressed off-campus student speech in 1972,
shortly after Tinker was decided, in Shanley v. Northeast Independent
School District.119 In Shanley, students were suspended for distributing
an off-campus newspaper.120 The court analyzed the speech under Tinker
but held the circumstances did not justify the suspensions of the
students.121 A year later, the court addressed a similar question in
41, 49 (2d Cir. 2008) (using the reasonably foreseeable and Tinker tests for off-campus speech),
with J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 928 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(using the reasonably foreseeable and Tinker approaches, with emphasis on intent).
116. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567. The student was suspended for five days for creating a MySpace
page titled “S.A.S.H.,” which stood for “Students Against Shay’s Herpes,” referring to a fellow
classmate. The student invited over 100 people to join the “hate website,” in which students posted
hateful comments and ridiculing photographs depicting their animosity toward the fellow student.
Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567–68.
117. Id. at 573. See Hofheimer, supra note 14, at 984 (discussing the “sufficient nexus”
threshold employed by the Fourth Circuit in Kowalski).
118. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573; Hofheimer, supra note 14, at 984 (“The court found . . . a
sufficient nexus between the speech and the school’s pedagogical goals in protecting its students
from such assaultive speech.”).
119. 462 F.2d 960, 960 (5th Cir. 1972).
120. Id. The school justified the suspension under a school policy that prohibited the distribution
of any material without the express consent of the school. Id. at 964. The newspaper, titled
Awakening, was authored by five students during out-of-school hours and without any school
support. The students distributed the newspapers before and after school, near but not on school
property. Although some newspapers did turn up at the school, the students did not encourage any
distribution of the papers during school hours. The court found that “[t]here was absolutely no
disruption of class that resulted from distribution of the newspaper, nor were there any disturbances
whatsoever attributable to the distribution. It was acknowledged by all concerned with this case
that the students who passed out the newspapers did so politely and in orderly fashion.” Shanley,
462 F.2d at 964.
121. Id. The court found the suspension was unjustified because no disruption occurred or was
reasonably foreseeable to occur. Shanley was one of the first decisions regarding off-campus speech
post Tinker. In its decision, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that nothing in Tinker allows the
prohibition of off-campus speech that does not disrupt the schoolhouse and “it is not at all unusual
to allow the geographical location of the actor to determine the constitutional protection that should
be afforded to his or her acts.” Shanley, 462 F.2d at 974. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (applying the material and substantial disruption test).
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Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District.122 Incorporating the
same reasoning as Shanley, the court held the students’ suspensions for
distributing an off-campus newspaper were not justified under Tinker.123
However, in 2001, the Fifth Circuit changed its approach to offcampus speech in Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board.124 In Porter,
the court expressed discontent with applying Tinker to off-campus
speech.125 The court held that school administrators did not have the
authority to punish a student for a drawing, which depicted a violent
siege, because he did not intend for this speech to reach the school.126 In
contrast with its approach in Shanley and Sullivan, the Fifth Circuit
tweaked its Tinker analysis to fit the facts before it, foreshadowing the
approach the court would take decades later in addressing online offcampus speech.127
Shanley, Sullivan, and Porter dealt with speech that occurred offcampus, but not in cyberspace.128 In 2015, the Fifth Circuit, en banc,
122. 475 F.2d 1071, 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
123. Paul’s conduct can hardly be characterized as pristine, passive acts of protest “akin to
pure speech” involved in Tinker. Rather, Paul defied Mr. Cotton’s request that he stop selling
newspapers, persisted in returning to the campus during the initial six-day suspension period,
and twice shouted profanity at Mr. Cotton within the hearing of others. Paul’s reappearance
on the campus and continued sale of the newspapers on October 26 only served to exacerbate
the situation.
Id. at 1075. The court implied that selling the newspapers in an isolated situation would have met
the level of constitutional protection afforded by the First Amendment. Id. See Waldman, supra
note 12, at 602 (noting that it was the conduct of the student, not the newspaper, that warranted the
suspension).
124. Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619 (5th Cir. 2004). The court discussed
the inconsistencies between courts, and called for the federal circuits to “more clearly delineate the
boundary line between off-campus speech entitled to greater First Amendment protection, and oncampus speech subject to greater regulation.” Id. at 619–20.
125. Id. at 620 (noting that “[b]ecause Adam’s drawing was composed off-campus, displayed
only to members of his own household, stored off-campus, and not purposefully taken by him to
[the school] or publicized in a way certain to result in its appearance at [the school], we have found
that the drawing is protected by the First Amendment”).
126. Id. at 611. The sketch depicted his school under siege by machinery, contained obscenities
and racial epithets, and showed the school principal under attack. The sketch was discovered by
school officials two years later due to the student’s younger brother bringing the sketch pad to
school for a reason wholly unrelated to the sketch. The student was subsequently enrolled in an
alternative school. Porter, 393 F.3d at 611–12. See Mary Jo Roberts, Porter v. Ascension Parish
School Board: Drawing in the Contours of First Amendment Protection for Student Art and
Expression, 52 LOY. L. REV. 467 (2006) (discussing the factual underpinnings and reasoning in
Porter).
127. Compare Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1076 (5th Cir. 1973)
(applying a traditional Tinker analysis), with Shanley v. N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 967
(5th Cir. 1972) (applying a traditional Tinker analysis a year before Sullivan was decided).
128. Porter, 393 F.3d at 619 (discussing student speech concerning a violent drawing); Sullivan,
475 F.2d at 1076 (discussing student speech concerning a newspaper); Shanley, 462 F.2d at 965
(discussing student speech concerning a newspaper).
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addressed the issue of when a school could discipline a student for his or
her off-campus, online speech in Bell v. Itawamba County School
Board.129 The majority opinion held that Tinker analysis applied, but
failed to adopt or reject approaches advocated by other circuits.130 The
court simply fashioned a Tinker threshold test limited to the facts of the
case.131 Thus, the court held that Tinker can apply to off-campus, online
speech when a student directs the speech at the school and school officials
understand it as harassing a teacher.132 Answering these questions in the
affirmative, the court then concluded that the discipline was justified
because the school officials could foresee the speech would cause a
material and substantial disruption in the school.133
5. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit’s approach to this issue is similar to the Second
Circuit because both add a “reasonably foreseeable” threshold to the
Tinker test.134 In 1970, the Seventh Circuit addressed its first case
pertaining to off-campus student speech in Scoville v. Board of Education
of Joliet Township.135 In Scoville, the court used a Tinker analysis to
129. 799 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 2015). In Bell, a student recorded a rap song outside of school
and posted the audio on his Facebook profile. Id. The rap made derogatory reference to school
teachers, accused coaches of sexual harassment, and was full of obscene and vulgar language. Id.
The student was suspended and brought suit against the school district for violation of his First
Amendment rights. Id. at 389. See Shaver, supra note 15, at 1573 (“[T]he en banc panel of the court
was highly divided. Of the twelve judges in the majority, six judges authored or joined in separately
written concurring opinions. Four judges dissented from the decision, and each of the dissenting
judges wrote a separate dissenting opinion.”).
130. Bell, 799 F.3d at 396 (stating “[f]urther, in holding Tinker applies to the off-campus speech
in this instance, because such determinations are heavily influenced by the facts in each matter, we
decline: to adopt any rigid standard in this instance . . .”).
131. Id.; Katherine D. Landfried, Bell v. Itawamba County School Board: The Need for a
Balance of Freedom and Authority, 36 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 193, 202 (2017) (articulating the
reasoning the court used to identify the correct threshold under which to consider the facts and
concluding that “via process of elimination, the court determines that Bell’s speech should be
analyzed under Tinker”).
132. Bell, 799 F.3d at 386. For more discussion of the test articulated in Bell, see Margaret
Malloy, Bell v. Itawamba County School Board: Testing the Limits of First Amendment Protection
of Off-Campus Student Speech, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1251, 1264–67 (2016).
133. Bell, 799 F.3d at 399.
134. Although both circuits use thresholds that rely on foreseeability, the Second Circuit looks
at whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the conduct would create a risk of substantial disruption
in the school, and the Seventh Circuit looks at whether the school officials could reasonably forecast
the conduct would cause a substantial disruption in school. Compare Wisniewski v. Board of Educ.
of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting the reasonably foreseeable
to cause a substantial disruption threshold), with Scoville v. Bd. of Ed. of Joliet Twp. High Sch.
Dist. 204, Will Cty., State of Ill., 425 F.2d 10, 13 (7th Cir. 1970) (discussing whether school
officials could “reasonably forecast” the conduct would create a substantial disruption).
135. Scoville, 425 F.2d at 15. See generally ALAN GORR, PROBLEMS IN TODAY’S EDUCATION
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determine whether high school students who wrote critical off-campus
newspaper articles about school policies could be disciplined.136 The
court held that because school officials could not reasonably foresee that
the publication would substantially interfere with the school, the
suspension violated the students’ First Amendment rights.137
The Seventh Circuit again addressed the issue in 1998, in Boucher v.
School Board of the School District of Greenfield.138 The court held that
Tinker authorized the expulsion of a student who wrote an off-campus
newspaper article because the school board could reasonably foresee a
material and substantial disruption in school.139
6. Eighth Circuit
Similar to the Second and Seventh Circuits, the Eighth Circuit applies
the Tinker test with the extra foreseeability requirement.140 In 2011, the
Eighth Circuit reviewed two off-campus speech cases dealing with the
Internet.141 D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District #60 dealt with a
student who sent instant messages from his home computer that referred
to shooting other students at school.142 The court concluded that the
statements were not protected under a “true threat” analysis, nor under
Tinker, because it was reasonably foreseeable that the speech would
cause a substantial disruption in the school.143
235–55 (1973) (discussing the arguments of the respondent and the petitioner in Scoville).
136. Scoville, 425 F.3d at 17.
137. Id. See Levin, supra note 25, at 871 (discussing generally the “reasonably forecast”
standard that was employed by the Seventh Circuit in Scoville).
138. 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1988).
139. Id. at 822–23. The newspaper article provided instructions on how to hack school
computers. The court held that because the content of the article was threatening to the schools’
resources, and the article was distributed on school grounds, “a reasonable forecast of disruption is
all that would be required of the [school] board” in order to uphold the expulsion. Boucher, 134
F.3d at 828.
140. Compare Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d
Cir. 2007) (applying a reasonably foreseeable threshold to Tinker), with Scoville, 425 F.2d at 16
(applying a “reasonably forecast” threshold to Tinker, from the administrator’s point of view), and
D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 760 (8th Cir. 2011) (applying
a reasonably foreseeable threshold from the point of view of a reasonable person).
141. Hannibal, 647 F.3d at 756; S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d
771 (8th Cir. 2011).
142. Hannibal, 647 F.3d at 758 (quoting the transcript of the messages: “C.M. asks D.J.M.
‘what kidna gun did your friend have again?’ D.J.M. responds ‘357 magnum.’ C.M. then replies,
‘haha would you shoot [L.] or let her live?’ D.J.M. answers ‘i still like her so I would say let her
live.’ C.M. follows up by asking, ‘well who would you shoot then lol,’ to which D.J.M. responds
‘everyone else’”).
143. Id. at 764 (in analyzing the speech under the “true threat” doctrine, the court places special
emphasis on the speaker’s intent, quoting Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 627
(8th Cir. 2002), which defined a true threat as a “statement that a reasonable recipient would have
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In S.J.W ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 School District, the court
held that off-campus student speech that causes a substantial disruption
in school is not protected.144 In Wilson, students were suspended for
writing an online blog that contained offensive, sexually explicit, racist,
and degrading comments about other classmates.145 The court reasoned
that because the speech was targeted at the school and it was reasonably
foreseeable that it would cause a substantial disruption, Tinker applied,
regardless of where the speech occurred.146 As illustrated by these two
cases, the Eighth Circuit expressly adopts both a “true threat” and a
Tinker approach to off-campus student speech.147
7. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit’s off-campus student speech jurisprudence, and
decisions regarding what rule should govern, contradicts other circuits’
interpretations of Tinker.148 In LaVine v. Blaine School District, the court
held that schools may take disciplinary action in response to off-campus
speech that meets the requirements of Tinker.149 However, twelve years
later, in Wynar v. Douglas County, the court clarified that Tinker could
only be applied to off-campus speech if there is an identifiable threat of
school violence.150 The Wynar court held that students sending
interpreted as a serious expression of an intent to cause harm”). See John L. Hughes III, Social
Networking and Student Safety: Balancing Student First Amendment Rights and Disciplining
Threatening Speech, 7 UMASS. L. REV. 208, 227 (2012) (arguing that the Hannibal decision is
“illustrative of recent court decisions regarding threatening student speech, as it utilizes both the
Watts true threat and Tinker tests in coming to its decision”).
144. 696 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 2011).
145. See id. at 733 (indicating that the blog posts “contained a variety of offensive and racist
comments as well as sexually explicit and degrading comments about particular female classmates,
whom they identified by name. The racist posts discussed fights at Lee’s Summit North and mocked
black students. A third student added another racist post”).
146. Id. at 778. The court devotes substantial discussion to the other circuits that have applied
Tinker to off-campus speech; specifically, the Second Circuit’s ruling in Doninger v. Niehoff, the
Fourth Circuit in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, and the Third Circuit in J.S. v. Blue
Mountain School District. See supra Part I.D.1, 2, 3 for further analysis of those cases.
147. Wilson, 696 F.3d at 776; Hannibal, 647 F.3d at 759. See supra Part I.C (discussing the
“true threat” test).
148. Compare LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist, 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Tinker
applies to off-campus speech), with Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir.
2013) (holding that Tinker cannot apply to all off-campus speech).
149. LaVine, 257 F.3d at 984. The poem at issue depicted a student’s wish to shoot classmates.
The court opened by stating, “[t]his case has its genesis in a high school student’s poem which led
to his temporary, emergency expulsion from school. It arises against a backdrop of tragic school
shootings. . . .” Id. For a look at the issue of true threats, freedom of speech, and school shootings,
see Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Public Schools in a Post-Columbine World: Check Your Speech
Rights at the Schoolhouse Metal Detector, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 739, 740 (2000).
150. Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069 (“Here we make explicit what was implicit in LaVine: when faced
with an identifiable threat of school violence, schools may take disciplinary action in response to
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threatening instant messages constituted a threat of school violence, and
thus the speech was not protected by the First Amendment.151 However,
the court was clear that absent a ruling from the Supreme Court, there is
not a one-size-fits-all approach to off-campus speech.152
8. Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit applied a Tinker and true threat approach in Boim
v. Fulton County School District.153 In Boim, school authorities expelled
a student after they discovered a notebook entry describing a dream in
which the student shot and killed a teacher.154 While the writing took
place off campus, the court held the school was justified in punishing the
student under the “true threat” and Tinker tests.155 Unlike the Third
Circuit in similar circumstances, the Eleventh Circuit did not place
emphasis on the student’s intent, declaring the student’s intention to keep
the notebook entry private immaterial.156 While not dealing directly with
online speech, the court’s ruling could imply that both Tinker and “true
off-campus speech that meets the requirements of Tinker.”).
151. Id. at 1064. The threatening instant messages consisted of “bragging about his weapons,
threatening to shoot specific classmates, [and] intimating that he would ‘take out’ other people at a
school shooting on a specific date.” Id. at 1065. The court applies the facts to the threshold tests the
other circuits have used, but declines to adopt any bright-line test for approaching off campus
speech, writing: “given the subject and addressees of Landon’s messages, it is hard to imagine how
their nexus to the school could have been more direct; for the same reasons, it should have been
reasonably foreseeable to Landon that his messages would reach campus.” Id. at 1069. See
generally May, supra note 14, at 1110 (discussing the circuit split regarding which test to apply to
off-campus speech).
152. See Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1064 (stating “we are reluctant to try to craft a one-size fits all
approach”); Kellman, supra note 47, at 374 (discussing the problems arising due to the Court’s
silence on the issue of off-campus student speech).
153. 494 F.3d 978, 985 (11th Cir. 2007).
154. Id. The notebook entry was titled “Dream” and vividly depicted the student shooting her
teacher. Id. at 980. School administrators discovered it after the student’s art teacher confiscated it
in class. Id. at 984.
155. Id. The court writes about the importance of maintaining safety in schools, especially after
Columbine, stating: “Thus, in this climate of increasing school violence and government oversight,
and in light of schools’ undisputedly compelling interest in acting quickly to prevent violence on
school property, especially during regular school hours, we must conclude that the defendants did
not violate Rachel’s First Amendment rights.” Id. at 984. See Brief of Appellants David Boim and
Kim Boim at 5, Boim v. Fulton Cty. Sch. Dist, 494 F.3d 978 (11th Cir. 2006) (No. 06-14706-JJ),
2006 WL 3671902 (confirming the narrative was written at home); William Bird, Constitutional
Law-True Threat Doctrine and Public School Speech- An Expansive View of A School’s Authority
to Discipline Allegedly Threatening Student Speech Arising Off Campus, 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L. REV. 111, 129 (2003) (analyzing how the court’s decisions pertaining to threatening speech on
and off campus has changed post-Columbine).
156. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 932 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (holding that because the student did not intend for the speech to come to school, his speech
is protected); supra note 109 and accompanying text (describing the different types of intent in
various circuits).
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threat” analyses could apply to off-campus, online speech if faced with
the issue.157
9. Remaining Circuits
The First, Sixth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have not yet addressed the
issue of off-campus student speech.158 For the purposes of this Comment,
discussion is limited to the cases that reached the federal appellate courts;
district court opinions regarding similar issues are not included.159
E. School Social Media Policies
School districts enact their own specific policies to regulate students’
conduct outside of school in light of the digital age, similar to the
approaches taken by the federal appellate courts.160 School districts vary
in the amount of protection and restriction given to social media speech,
and some do not have written restrictions at all.161 For example, JordanElbridge Central School District’s social media policy prohibits students
from writing sensitive, confidential, or disparaging posts on personal
social media accounts, while Pottsville Area School District expressly
prohibits any content that could disrupt the school or rights of others. 162
157. While this Comment focuses on the holdings of the federal courts of appeals, a ruling from
the District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Evans v. Bayer is instructive as to how the
Eleventh Circuit could rule in future off-campus student speech cases. 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365. The
court held that a student could not be punished for creating a social media web page with derogatory
comments about a teacher, under Tinker, when the speech did not cause any substantial disruption
and was not accessed on campus. Id. at 1378.
158. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3369 (discussing each federal appellate court’s review
of off-campus student speech, but does not include the First, Sixth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits because
they have not addressed the issue).
159. Because this Comment is focused on the federal appellate courts, it does not discuss any
district court rulings on the subject matter. However, in 2013, the District Court for the Eastern
Division of Tennessee addressed the issue in Nixon v. Hardin County Board of Education. 988 F.
Supp. 2d 826 (W.D. Tenn. 2013). In Nixon, the student was required to attend an alternative school
and participate in counseling because she sent threatening tweets directed toward another student.
Id. at 832. The court held that because the speech was made off-campus, was not directed at the
school, did not involve any school equipment, and did not cause a substantial disruption, the
defendants’ summary judgment motion could not succeed. Id. at 839. The court used the sufficient
nexus precursor to the Tinker test to opine on the issue. See generally Catherine E. Mendola, Big
Brother as Parent: Using Surveillance to Patrol Students’ Internet Speech, 35 B.C. J.L. & SOC.
JUST. 153, 182 (2015) (discussing the prevalence of social media in student speech cases).
160. Schools must ensure these policies do not conflict with other policies and meet standards
imposed by law. See Steven Anderson, How to Create Social Media Guidelines for Your School,
EDUTOPIA.ORG
(2017),
https://www.edutopia.org/pdfs/edutopia-anderson-social-mediaguidelines.pdf (providing a step-by-step process schools should abide by when creating social
media policies).
161. See infra Part III.B (comparing and contrasting social media policies and the differences
in restrictions and protections in each policy).
162. Compare Jordan-Elbridge CSD Social Media Code of Ethics for Students 7310, JORDAN-
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Meanwhile, in its general student handbook, Berkeley County School
District prohibits off-campus conduct that could foreseeably cause a
disruption in the school.163 In Part III of this Comment, these school
policies are analyzed in an effort to provide guidance as to how schools
can reconcile the differing federal appellate courts’ approaches and create
policies that protect students’ constitutional rights while still maintaining
order in the schoolhouse.164
II. DISCUSSION
While the Supreme Court remains silent on the issue of off-campus
student speech, its rulings on the Internet may be instructive for the
conflicting federal appellate courts and school districts dealing with
student speech on social media.165 Two seminal holdings in Reno v.
ACLU and Packingham v. North Carolina represent the Court’s
application of the First Amendment to the Internet.166 Section A begins
by discussing the Court’s holding in Reno, which held that blanket
provisions regulating the Internet were unconstitutional.167 Next, Section
B discusses the factual background and the Court’s reasoning in
Packingham, which established First Amendment protection for social
media.168 Finally, this Part examines the levels of scrutiny applied to the
Internet and the differences between content-neutral and content-based
regulations.169
ELBRIDGE
CENT.
SCH.
DIST.
(03/02/2016),
http://www.jecsd.org/files/filesystem/SocialMediaPolicyStudents.pdf
[hereinafter
JordanElbridge Social Media Policy] (listing fourteen restrictions on social media use), with Pottsville
Area School District: Social Media Policy 816, POTTSVILLE AREA SCH. DIST. (08/17/2011),
https://www.pottsville.k12.pa.us/cms/lib/PA01916599/Centricity/Domain/38/Social%20Media%
20Policy%20-%20Students.pdf [hereinafter Pottsville Social Media Policy] (limiting any conduct
which could foreseeably cause a disruption).
163. See Student Handbook: Student Conduct, BERKELEY COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT (2015),
https://www.berkeleycountyschools.org/cms/lib02/WV01000962/Centricity/Domain/20/201516%20Generic%20Handbook%20Electronic%20Copy.pdf
[hereinafter
Berkeley
Policy]
(prohibiting social media postings for the purpose of bullying).
164. See infra Part III.B (analyzing the positives and negative of three schools’ social media
policies).
165. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017) (stating that social media
is one of the most important places to exchange views); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521
U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“Today, one of the most important places to exchange views is
cyberspace. . . .”).
166. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738 (holding social media is protected speech); Reno, 521 U.S.
at 870 (finding the Internet to be protected speech).
167. See infra Part II.A (discussing the factual background, holding, and reasoning in Reno).
168. See infra Part II.B (discussing the background, reasoning, and majority and concurring
opinions in Packingham).
169. See infra Part II.A, B (discussing strict scrutiny as applied to content-based restrictions and
intermediate scrutiny as applied to content-neutral restrictions).
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A. Reno Sets the Stage for Judicial Internet Analysis
Reno was the first Internet-related case to be resolved in the Supreme
Court. In Reno, the American Civil Liberties Union brought suit against
the Attorney General of the United States, arguing that two provisions of
the Communications Decency Act violated the First Amendment.170
These provisions sought to protect minors from obscene and sexual
content on the Internet by prohibiting purposeful transmission of any
lewd content to a minor.171 The government argued that these provisions
were narrow enough to further its interest in protecting minors from
harmful content.172 However, the Court held that the blanket provisions
were an impermissible infringement on free speech rights. 173 The two
provisions were content-based restrictions because they regulated the
subject matter and type of speech.174 As such, the Supreme Court applied
strict scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of the provisions.175
In order to withstand strict scrutiny, a content-based restriction must
be based on a compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.176 But, because the content-based restriction in
Reno was overbroad and vague, as the terms “indecent” and “obscene”
were not defined, the statute did not meet strict scrutiny.177 Further, the
170. Reno, 521 U.S. at 861.
171. Id. at 858. The first provision, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a), “prohibit[s] the knowing transmission
of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18.” Id. The second provision, 47 U.S.C. §
223(b), “prohibits the knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a manner
that is available to a person under 18.” Id.
172. Reno, 521 U.S. at 858; see Brief for Appellants at 12, Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union,
521 U.S. 844 (2007) (No. 96-511), 1997 WL 32931, at *12 (arguing the statute is narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling government interest).
173. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868 (noting that the CDA is a content-based blanket restriction on
speech). See Andrew H. Montroll, Students’ Free Speech Rights in Public Schools: Content-Based
Versus Public Forum Restrictions, 13 VT. L. REV. 493, 500 (1989) (describing the connection
between content-based restrictions for adults and content-based restrictions for students and giving
a general background on content-based restrictions in the court system).
174. Reno, 521 U.S. at 864. See Blum et al., Tests to be applied to content-based and contentneutral regulations, 16A AM. JUR. 2D CONST. L. § 480 (2017) (describing the analysis concerning
content-based restrictions).
175. Reno, 521 U.S. at 857. Content-based restrictions on speech are typically held
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court illustrated this reasoning in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, writing:
“[t]he First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech, or even
expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based regulations are
presumptively invalid.” 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (citations omitted).
176. Blum, supra note 174 (discussing the requirements for state-implemented restrictions of
expression to survive strict scrutiny); Stephen C. Jacques, Comment, Reno v. ACLU: Insulating
the Internet, the First Amendment, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1945, 1981–
82 (1997) (“Using this analysis, the Court asked whether the CDA served a compelling government
interest, and whether it was narrowly tailored to accomplishes [sic] that end using the least
restrictive means.”).
177. Reno, 521 U.S. at 860 (holding the statute was unconstitutional because of its over-breadth
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Court believed the statute would regulate more content than was intended
and potentially chill Internet expression.178 The Court nonetheless held
that if the statute was narrowly rewritten to achieve the compelling
purpose of protecting minors, the Internet was not insulated from
regulation.179
The issue the Court addressed in Reno involved the Internet as a whole,
rather than social media websites specifically.180 But Reno remains
fundamental in this discussion because the Court emphasized that the
growing role of the Internet in society “continues to be phenomenal,”
setting up a line of reasoning that the Court in Packingham relied upon.181
Because it is one of the only Supreme Court decisions discussing the
impact of the Internet, Reno is the starting point for scholarly analysis
relating to restrictions on Internet usage—specifically, how far Reno’s
protection can stretch.182
B. Packingham v. North Carolina: Social Media Has First Amendment
Protection
Packingham presented a challenge to a North Carolina statute that
prohibited sex offenders from accessing social networking websites.183
In 2002, petitioner Lester Packingham pled guilty to taking indecent

and vagueness). See Jacques, supra note 176, at 1982 (discussing the Court’s reasoning pertaining
to the vagueness of the statute and noting that “[b]y failing to narrowly tailor the language of the
statute . . . Congress passed an act that was dangerously vague and clearly unconstitutional under a
strict scrutiny analysis”).
178. Reno, 521 U.S. at 871–72 (“The vagueness of such a regulation raises special First
Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech.”). For more information
about the chilling effect, see Jennifer M. Kinsley, CHILL, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 253, 268 (2016)
(discussing the “chilling effect” and the implications resulting from governmental regulations on
speech); see also Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling
Effect”, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693 (1978) (describing the fear of the chilling effect in society).
179. Reno, 521 U.S. at 880.
180. Id. at 885. Although the decision in Reno did not discuss social media in particular, the
statement “[t]he record demonstrates that the growth of the Internet has been and continues to be
phenomenal” foreshadowed a future case, Packingham v. North Carolina. In Packingham, the
Court alluded to the same premise, additionally upholding another realm of the Internet as protected
speech. 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
181. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (providing a background of the “vast democratic
forums of the Internet” (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 868)).
182. Laura Leets, Responses to Internet Hate Sites: Is Speech Too Free in Cyberspace?, 6
COMM. L. & POL’Y 287, 295 (2001) (discussing Reno’s impact on Internet hate speech). See Alissa
Ardito, Social Media, Administrative Agencies, and the First Amendment, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 301,
356 (2013) (discussing Reno’s potential implication in social media cases).
183. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(a) (providing “[i]t
is unlawful for a sex offender who is registered . . . to access a commercial social networking Web
site . . .”).
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liberties with a child and was required to register as a sex offender.184 In
2010, a state court dismissed a traffic citation against Packingham.185 In
response, he posted a message on his Facebook profile, thanking God for
his good luck.186 However, under N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14–202.5, his
status as a sex offender barred him from accessing social networking sites
that he knew minors frequent.187 Packingham was arrested and convicted
for violating the statute.188
Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority and held the statute
unconstitutional, emphasizing the importance of the Internet to First
Amendment expression.189 The Court observed that “while in the past
there may have been difficulties in identifying the most important places
(in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear.
It is cyberspace . . . and social media in particular.”190 Providing further
insight into the role social media plays in society, the Court noted that
seven in ten American adults use at least one social media website and
that Facebook’s membership of 1.79 billion users is three times the size
of North America.191 Justice Kennedy described the positive impact
184. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734. See State v. Packingham, 777 S.E.2d 738, 743–44 (N.C.
2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (providing a procedural history and in-depth factual
background in the North Carolina Supreme Court decision).
185. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734; Brief for Petitioner at 4, Packingham v. North Carolina,
137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (No. 15–1194), 2016 WL 7321777, at *4 [hereinafter Packingham Brief for
Petitioner].
186. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734. The statement said: “Man God is Good! How about I got
so much favor they dismissed the ticket before court even started? No fine, no court cost, no nothing
spent. Praise be to GOD, WOW! Thank JESUS!” See Packingham Brief for Petitioner, supra note
185, at 4 (discussing the petitioner’s intent behind the Facebook post was to express his content
and his permitted First Amendment rights).
187. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734. The statute provides that it is:
[U]nlawful for a sex offender who is registered in accordance with Article 27A of
Chapter 14 of the General Statutes to access a commercial social networking Web site
where the sex offender knows that the site permits minor children to become members
or to create or maintain personal Web pages on the commercial social networking Web
site.
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-202.5(a). Violation of the statute is a Class I felony. Id. at § 14202.5(e).
188. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1734. Packingham argued that the law violated his First
Amendment rights, but he was convicted at trial. However, his conviction was reversed in the North
Carolina Court of Appeals. The North Carolina Supreme Court reinstated the ruling of the trial
court, finding that the state had sufficient interest in “forestall[ing] the illicit lurking and contact”
of registered sex offenders and their victims.” Packingham, 777 S.E.2d at 746. See State v.
Packingham, 748 S.E.2d 146 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (vacating the opinion of the trial court).
189. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735.
190. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
191. Id. See, e.g., Social Media Statistics for June 2017, NAT. ARCHIVES (June 1, 2017),
https://www.archives.gov/files/social-media/reports/social-media-stats-fy-2017-06.pdf (providing
a detailed review of social media statistics as of June 2017); Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW
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websites like Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter have on the expression of
diverse ideas and protected First Amendment activity. 192 Specifically, the
Court noted the important role social media plays in expressing religious
beliefs, debating politics, engaging in the democratic process by
petitioning elected officials, and advancing careers.193
The Court additionally warned that it must exercise extreme caution
before ruling, or even suggesting, that the First Amendment does not
provide protection for social media because the forces of the Internet are
new and constantly changing.194 Justice Kennedy likened the Internet to
a public park; but, since speech from the Internet has the ability to reach
people worldwide, the Internet has now surpassed the public park to
become the most important channel for expression.195 However, the
Court recognized that First Amendment protection cannot apply to all
circumstances, and there are certainly instances in which speech can be
curtailed.196 In this instance, though, because this content-neutral
regulation of speech burdened significantly more speech than necessary
to advance the government’s important interest in protecting vulnerable
victims from dangerous predators, North Carolina did not meet its
burden.197
North Carolina argued, and the Court agreed, that the statute was
content-neutral because it prohibited access to websites without regard to
the content of viewpoints expressed.198 Unlike the content-based statute
RESEARCH CTR., (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/ (providing
statistics on social media use in 2016).
192. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (citing Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844,
870 (1997) (internal quotations omitted)). See Marco della Cava, How Facebook Changed our
Lives,
USA
TODAY
(Feb.
2,
2014,
10:19
AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/02/02/facebook-turns-10-cultural-impact/5063979/
(discussing the impact of Facebook and the business model of the social media giant).
193. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735–36 (discussing the impact social media platforms have on
citizens’ lives, stating: “[i]n short, social media users employ these websites to engage in a wide
array of protected First Amendment activity on topics ‘as diverse as human thought’” (quoting
Reno, 521 U.S. at 870)). See Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 15–16, Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (No. 15–
1194), 2016 WL 7449172 [hereinafter Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation] (providing
statistics of how many people use social media platforms for a wide variety of protected activities).
194. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736.
195. Id. at 1737 (“These websites can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available
to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard. They allow a person with an Internet connection
to ‘become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.’”
(quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 870)).
196. Id. See Blake A. Klinker, Yes, You Do Have a First Amendment Right to Social Media,
WYO. LAW., Aug. 1, 2017, at 54 (expressing that the Court left open the possibility of crafting a
narrow law that would withstand intermediate scrutiny).
197. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738.
198. Id. See Brief for Respondent at 40, Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017)
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in Reno, a content-neutral regulation controls the circumstances under
which speech may take place, also known as time, place, and manner
restrictions.199 Content-neutral regulations are subject to intermediate
scrutiny, which triggers analysis of whether the challenged statute
advances an important government interest by means that are
substantially related to achieving that interest.200 The Court disagreed
that the statute could withstand intermediate scrutiny because, while
protecting children is certainly an important interest, the means were not
substantially related to achieving that interest because the statute
burdened significantly more speech than necessary.201 But, the Court
made it clear that a state could accomplish this goal by enacting a more
narrowly written statute.202 Thus, under Packingham, a government
entity may only regulate the Internet, or social media, when the regulation
is specific enough to curtail only the speech that is necessary to further
an important government interest.203
Justice Alito, in a concurring opinion, agreed the content-neutral
statute could not withstand intermediate scrutiny because it forbid access
to websites unlikely to facilitate the government’s important interest.204
However, Justice Alito argued the majority erred in equating the Internet
with a public forum, expressing concern that the Court’s loose rhetoric
could prevent states from regulating the Internet altogether.205
(No. 15–1194), 2017 WL 345120 (“Second-guessing the North Carolina Legislature’s judgment,
petitioner claims that Section 202.5 is broader than necessary, and that less speech-restrictive
measures could as effectively achieve the State’s objective of protecting children from sexual
predators. Neither contention is correct.”).
199. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1739 (Alito, J., concurring). See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW
OF LAWYER ADVERTISING § 2:9 (2017) (discussing content-neutral regulations analyses); Martin
Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 128 (1981)
(analyzing the approaches to content-neutral and content-based restrictions on speech).
200. See Montroll, supra note 173, at 500 (discussing the content-neutral regulations and the
type of analysis rendered when presented in court).
201. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738.
202. Id. at 1737; Klinker, supra note 196, at 55 (“Thus, it appears that Packingham presents an
invitation for legislatures to go back to the drawing board to craft laws which more ‘specifically’
target internet-based harms.”).
203. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737. See infra Part III (discussing public school policies that
would probably not survive under Packingham scrutiny).
204. In his concurring opinion for Packingham, Justice Alito wrote:
I am troubled by the Court’s loose rhetoric. After noting that “a street or a park is a
quintessential forum for the exercise of First Amendment rights,” the Court states that
“cyberspace” and “social media in particular” are now the “most important places (in a
spatial sense) for the exchange of views.”
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring).
205. Id. Justice Alito’s concurring opinion did not go unnoticed, as David Post of The
Washington Post opined that the concurring justices:
[A]greed with the majority that the NC statute “sweeps far too broadly to satisfy the
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Addressing the majority’s contention that courts need to be careful before
handing down opinions or fashioning rules regarding the Internet, Alito
reasoned that the Court explicitly did what it warned of.206 Thus, Alito
disagreed with the majority’s heightened protection of the Internet and
advocated for the enactment of narrower statutes in order to further
significant interests without burdening more speech than necessary. 207
Justice Kennedy highlighted an important issue when he wrote that
courts must be careful before reaching an opinion regarding the Internet
because “what they say today might be obsolete tomorrow.”208 It takes
years before the Supreme Court hears a case, as the United States legal
system can be slow and the appellate process is meticulous.209 Therefore,
instead of approaching the complicated issue of off-campus, online
student speech by waiting for the Court to provide guidance, schools
should take matters into their own hands.210 Schools should draft social
media policies themselves, implementing some of the tests set forth in the
federal appellate courts’ decisions, as well as the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Packingham, in order to create clear policies that instruct
students on exactly what conduct on social media will be subject to
punishment.211 However, in order to properly craft an ideal policy, it is
first necessary to analyze the approaches taken by the federal appellate
demands of the Free Speech Clause,” and they had no particular problem with the way
the majority characterized and undertook the First Amendment analysis in the case.
Rather unusually, I think, their disagreement focused entirely on nuance,
characterization and rhetoric . . .
David Post, Supreme Court Unanimously Overturns North Carolina’s Ban on Social-Media Use
by Sex Offenders, WASH. POST (July 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2017/07/03/supreme-court-unanimously-overturns-north-carolinas-ban-on-socialmedia-use-by-sex-offenders/?utm_term=.6a428fedab89.
206. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1744 (Alito, J., concurring) (“It is regrettable that the Court had
not heeded its own admonition of caution.”).
207. Id.; Klinker, supra note 196, at 55 (summarizing Justice Alito’s concurring opinion).
208. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1736. Justice Kennedy emphasized many of the statistics from
the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Amicus Curiae Brief in the text of his opinion. See Brief for
Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 193 (expressing that seven in ten American adults use
at least one Internet networking service).
209. Charles B. Elliott, The Legislatures and the Courts: The Power to Declare Statutes
Unconstitutional, 4 POL. SCI. Q. 224, 249 (1890) (discussing the slow process from the trial court
to the Supreme Court and arguing the legislature is better equipped to handle changing societal
interests); Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Politicians in Robes: The Separation of Powers and the
Problem of Judicial Legislation, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 31, 39 (2015),
http://www.virginialawreview.org/volumes/content/politicians-robes-separation-powers-andproblem-judicial-legislation (arguing that judges are not equipped to decide political questions left
for the legislature, describing the process as slow).
210. See infra Part IV (arguing for schools to approach this issue by enacting policies
themselves, instead of allowing courts to dictate what speech is protected).
211. See infra Part IV (proposing a model policy for school districts to implement to balance
their interests and students’ First Amendment rights).
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courts and some current school policies.
III. ANALYSIS
The federal appellate courts’ inconsistent approach to off-campus
student speech has resulted in an unpredictable application of the First
Amendment and uncertainty as to when off-campus student speech is
protected or within the realm of a school’s disciplinary authority. 212 In
Tinker, the Court established students’ First Amendment rights in
schools, but subsequent decisions afforded school administrators greater
authority to punish student speech.213
The Supreme Court has yet to hold that any particular test applies to
off-campus speech, yet the federal appellate courts have taken it upon
themselves to apply Supreme Court precedent, particularly Tinker, to offcampus, online speech.214 While not directly addressing the issue of offcampus speech, the Court in Packingham established that social media
deserves First Amendment protection; thus, restrictions on social media
deserve heightened scrutiny.215 As such, courts need to keep
Packingham’s reasoning in mind while ruling on off-campus, online
speech cases.216
This Part begins by analyzing and critiquing the threshold tests used
by the federal appellate courts and the impact these tests have on student
speech.217 Next, this Part looks at schools’ social media policies and
evaluates whether these restrictions on the Internet would be upheld
under the test the Court articulated in Packingham.218 Finally, this Part
addresses the “chilling effect” that results from overbroad restrictions on
212. Levin, supra note 25, at 869–70 (criticizing the circuit split and arguing for a uniform
approach because “the lower courts’ decisions lack any sense of uniformity”).
213. See supra Part I.A (discussing the Tinker approach); supra Part I.B (discussing the tests
articulated in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse as further restrictions on student speech inside the
schoolhouse).
214. See Jessica K. Boyd, Moving the Bully from the Schoolyard to Cyberspace: How Much
Protection Is Off-Campus Student Speech Awarded Under the First Amendment?, 64 ALA. L. REV.
1215, 1235 (2013) (“The Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits all applied Tinker in cases where
students were punished for off-campus Internet speech, barely pausing to consider whether the
Supreme Court intended Tinker to be applicable to students when they left school grounds.”);
Courtney M. Willard, Decoding Student Speech Rights: Clarification and Application of Supreme
Court Principles to Online Student Speech Cases, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 293, 312 (2013)
(tracing the history of student speech cases, from the armbands in Tinker to the blog post in
Wisniewski).
215. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of the factual
background, holding, reasoning, and scrutiny applied in Packingham.
216. See infra Part IV (proposing a framework for schools to adhere to while crafting social
media policies that fit within the reasoning of Packingham).
217. See infra Part III.A (analyzing the five threshold tests used by the federal appellate courts).
218. See infra Part III.B (discussing the policies incorporated by individual public schools).
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student speech.219
A. The Implications of the Circuits’ Inconsistent Threshold Tests
Most circuits apply a Tinker analysis to off-campus speech cases, but
some circuits tweak the test to focus on different factors that either allow
or prohibit the regulation of speech.220 While the problem lies in the
Supreme Court’s lack of precedent on the issue, it also lies within school
policies pertaining to social media.221 This Section is limited to
discussing the various approaches to social media speech and analyzing
what types of speech are inside the scope of schools’ authority to
discipline.222 Further, the analysis will examine the constitutionality of
these tests in light of the holding in Packingham.223
1. Reasonable Foreseeability Threshold to Tinker
The Second, Seventh, and Eighth circuits adopt the reasonable
foreseeability threshold to the Tinker test to analyze off-campus
speech.224 The courts first consider whether it was reasonably foreseeable
that the off-campus speech would reach the schoolhouse.225 If so, then
courts ask whether such off-campus speech would cause a substantial and

219. See infra Part III.C (discussing the “chilling effect” stemming from regulations on student
speech).
220. See Calve, supra note 82, at 386 (noting that “[c]ircuit courts have continuously invoked
Tinker to regulate off-campus cyberspeech, particularly when the speech is violent or threatening,
but the method of application is inconsistent across the country”); Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at
3420 (discussing the split among federal courts of appeals regarding whether Tinker extends to offcampus speech).
221. See Calve, supra note 82, at 400–01 (“Clashing decisions by lower courts about the
applicability of the Tinker substantial disruption test to off-campus student speech . . . amplified
the necessity for the Court’s guidance.”); Aaron J. Hersh, Rehabilitating Tinker: A Modest
Proposal to Protect Public-School Students’ First Amendment Free Expression Rights in the
Digital Age, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1309, 1321 (2007) (arguing that Tinker had been degraded over time
by subsequent decisions such as Fraser and Morse).
222. This Comment will not focus on off-campus speech that is written on tangible property,
spoken speech, or any speech that does not exist on a social networking website. For a discussion
of speech and the judicial analysis used for off-campus speech that does not occur online, see Porter
v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding the punishment of a student
for a violent drawing produced off-campus was unconstitutional).
223. See infra Part III.A (analyzing the threshold tests used by the federal appellate courts under
Packingham).
224. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3420 (discussing the reasonable foreseeability test
applied by the Second Circuit). See, e.g., S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist, 696
F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012) (using the reasonably foreseeable test); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41,
48 (2d Cir. 2008) (using the reasonable foreseeability threshold); Scoville v. Bd. of Educ. of Joilet
Twp. High Sch. Dist. 204, Cty. of Will., State of Ill., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970) (applying the
“reasonable foreseeability” test to off-campus speech, but not online off-campus speech).
225. See Doninger, 527 F.3d at 348 (articulating the “reasonable foreseeability” test).
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material disruption.226 This two-part test seems reasonable, but has its
flaws.227
First, the test is overly broad, akin to the speech-restrictive statute in
Packingham which the Court found unconstitutional.228 The breadth of
this test is illustrated in Doninger v. Niehoff.229 In Doninger, a student
was disciplined for writing a blog post casting administrators in a bad
light and encouraging peers to harass them.230 The Second Circuit
reasoned that the post was a foreseeable disruption to the school due to
the language used, the incorporation of false information, and the fact that
the post directly pertained to a school event.231 While the outcome may
have been correct in this limited instance, the test articulated in Doninger
fails to define the content that is within its intended scope.232 Consider a
hypothetical situation in which a student writes a blog post defending a
controversial immigration ban and encouraging others to speak out in the
same way.233 If it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech would cause
a material and substantial disruption in class, the school could lawfully
take disciplinary action.234 Political speech has consistently been
226. Id. For a in-depth discussion of what it might take to make speech “reasonably foreseeable”
to reach the schoolhouse, see Ronna Greff Schneider, General Restrictions on Freedom of Speech
in Schools, 1 EDUCATION LAW § 2:3 (2016) (analyzing the Tinker opinion and providing in-depth
information on the ‘substantial and material disruption’ standard); Levin, supra note 25, at 870
(making an argument as to what makes it reasonably foreseeable to administrators that online
speech will reach the schoolhouse, but stating that the standard is subjective).
227. Nathan S. Fronk, Doninger v. Niehoff: An Example of Public Schools’ Paternalism and
the Off-Campus Restriction of Students’ First Amendment Rights, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1417,
1438 (2009) (arguing the test used in Doninger is too broad and will be problematic for students
going forward).
228. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017). See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v.
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding “[a] bare
foreseeability standard could be stretched too far, and would risk ensnaring any off-campus
expression”); Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3430–31 (criticizing the reasonable foreseeability
threshold test).
229. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 348.
230. Id. See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing Doninger). See also supra note 101 and accompanying
text (discussing the speech at issue in Doninger).
231. For an in-depth review of the Court’s reasoning and the competing arguments, see Hayes,
supra note 102, at 260; Travis Miller, Doninger v. Niehoff: Taking Tinker Too Far, 5 LIBERTY U.
L. REV. 303, 324 (2011) (arguing that the Second Circuit has a misguided approach to applying
what Tinker was intended to portray, and “[s]uch an exercise of Tinker’s substantial disruption test
was never considered by the Court”).
232. See Fronk, supra note 227, at 1420 (arguing “the court did not define how or when its
[substantial disruption] test would be met”); Miller, supra note 231, at 324 (“This test, as Doninger
clearly noted, allows a school to suppress speech that it reasonably predicts will cause disruption.”).
233. In Snyder, Judge Smith hypothesized a scenario in which a student could be punished for
writing a controversial blog post on gay marriage, similar to the hypothetical posed herein. Snyder,
650 F.3d at 924.
234. Id. For further discussion on what constitutes a “substantial and material” disruption, see
Kristi L. Bowman, Symposium: The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, 58 AM. U. L.
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protected, but the breadth of this specific test could become a vehicle to
suppress this type of conduct.235
As the Court held in Packingham, statutes or policies enacted by a
governmental entity must be narrowly written to survive heightened
scrutiny.236 The North Carolina statute that was held unconstitutional in
Packingham was too broad because it restricted access to websites, and
thus speech, that was unrelated to the statute’s stated interest of protecting
minors from sexual predators.237 Similar to the statute in Packingham,
the reasonable foreseeability threshold does not define the type of speech
that one could reasonably foresee causing a substantial disruption.238 In
this regard, the test serves to limit more speech than necessary to protect
the interests of the schools.239
Second, the test affords school administrators too much discretion.240
REV. 1129 (2009); Levin, supra note 25, at 861 (defining “substantial disruption” as it was intended
in Tinker and the distorted definition school administrators use today).
235. See 147 CONG. REC. S.3233, 3235 (daily ed. June 19, 2001):
In the 21st Century, it’s easy to forget that America’s Founding Fathers sacrificed all to
give Americans political freedom. These patriots fought and risked their lives and
everything they had to secure and protect free political speech, dissent or assent, of all
kinds. Free political speech protects us from tyranny.
For a discussion on the history of political speech in the United States, see FLOYD ABRAMS, THE
SOUL OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT: WHY FREEDOM OF SPEECH MATTERS 25 (2017); Second Circuit
Holds That Qualified Immunity Shields School Officials Who Discipline Students for Their Online
Speech — Doninger v. Niehoff, 125 HARV. L. REV. 811, 817 (2008) (critiquing the broad test the
court promulgated in Doninger, and opining that the court “in effect suggested that student speech
is not protected when it causes or perpetuates a controversy at school or when it disrupts student
government”). See also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 423 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (“The
opinion of the Court does not endorse the broad argument advanced by petitioners and the United
States that the First Amendment permits public school officials to censor any student speech that
interferes with a school’s ‘educational mission.’”).
236. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (holding “[i]n order to survive
intermediate scrutiny, a law must be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest’” (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2014))).
237. See supra, Part II.C (discussing Packingham). See also Post, supra note 205 (“This statute
— like many of the laws concerning what sex offenders may and may not do — was preposterously
overly broad from the get-go, and the only question in my mind was whether any justices could
possibly fail to see that.”) (emphasis in original).
238. See Miller, supra note 231, at 321–23 (criticizing the test the court laid out in Doninger,
arguing that the “reasonable foreseeability” threshold is inconsistent with Tinker and “Doninger
took a misguided approach regarding when the Tinker test should govern”). See also Burch v.
Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that the Second Circuit’s approach, and thus
the reasonable foreseeability threshold, was “in fundamental conflict with the Supreme Court’s
analysis in Tinker”).
239. Compare Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008) (using the reasonable
foreseeability threshold and upholding the punishment for an off-campus blog post), with Layshock
ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2011) (using the intent
threshold to vacate the punishment for an off-campus blog post).
240. R. Chace Ramey, The School Official’s Ability to Limit Student First Amendment
Freedom: Exploring the boundaries of Student Speech and Expression in School as Defined by the
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Whether it is reasonably foreseeable that speech will reach school
property is certainly subjective, and what is foreseeable to one
administrator may not be foreseeable to another.241 The Eighth Circuit
illustrated this flaw in Wilson.242 The school administrators in Wilson
suspended two students for creating a website containing racist and
sexually explicit posts about other students at the high school.243 The
students used a foreign domain website, which prevented people in the
United States from finding the website through a typical search.244 But,
if a person knew the specific domain address, any user could find the
website.245 The court indicated that only a few students knew about the
website.246 Nonetheless, the administrators argued, and the court agreed,
it was reasonably foreseeable that this speech would reach the school,
despite the privacy precautions inherent in the post. 247 Thus, the court
implied that it is reasonably foreseeable that any online speech pertaining
to a student, teacher, or anything in relation to the school will reach school
grounds.248 This allows administrators broad discretion to characterize
United States Federal Courts (Spring 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Iowa University) (on file
with the Iowa University Library system); Jonathan Turley, Second Circuit Upholds Punishment
of High School Student for Out-of-School Web Entry, JONATHANTURLEY.ORG (May 30, 2008),
https://jonathanturley.org/2008/05/30/second-circuit-upholds-punishment-of-high-school-studentfor-out-of-school-web-entry/ (“The continual expansion of the authority of school officials over
student speech teaches a foul lesson to these future citizens. I would prefer some obnoxious speech
than teaching students that they must please government officials if they want special benefits . . .”).
241. Brief of Appellees at 53, S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d
771 (8th Cir. 2012) (No. 12–1727), 2012 WL 2884128 (“[T]he school’s strong authority over
student speech extends no further than the schoolhouse gates. Otherwise, simple enrollment in a
public school would operate as a partial forfeiture of otherwise inviolable First Amendment rights.
This is not, and cannot be, the law.”). See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d
915, 926 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding “[t]hose officials involved in the educational process
perform ‘important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions’ . . .” but that “[t]he authority of
public school officials is not boundless”).
242. See generally S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir.
2011).
243. Id. at 771, 774.
244. Id. at 774. For an explanation of a “foreign domain” website, see Todd Stone, What You
Didn’t Know About .LY, .TV, .SY and Other Foreign Domain Names, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 21,
2011, 12:48 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-you-didnt-know-about-ly-tv-sy-andother-foreign-domain-names-2011-7.
245. Wilson, 696 F.3d at 774 (“[A]ny U.S. user could access NorthPress if she knew the website
address. The site was not password protected.”); Stone, supra note 244 (discussing the significance
of registering a website under a foreign domain name).
246. Wilson, 696 F.3d at 775.
247. Id. at 778; Brief of Appellees at 12, S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist.,
supra note 241 (noting that the website was not password protected and, as such, it was accessible
to anyone).
248. J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(holding that in the absence of evidence that conduct would result in a substantial disruption, a
school official cannot characterize speech as “reasonably foreseeable” to reach school grounds
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any speech they find offensive as reasonably foreseeable to reach school
grounds.249 Furthermore, the broad discretion afforded to school
administrators potentially limits students’ conduct on all social media
platforms as well as the Internet in general, creating an impermissibly
broad limitation like the statute that was held unconstitutional in
Packingham.250
Finally, because any online speech may inevitably make its way to
school grounds due to the expansive reach of the Internet, the test fails to
afford sufficient protection for online speech.251 Because so many teens
report going online daily, all writings on social media may foreseeably
make their way onto school grounds.252 This subjects speech that is
spoken or written on paper to a higher degree of protection than speech
that is written online due to the pervasive nature of the Internet.253 Justice
Kennedy alluded to this premise in Packingham when he cautioned courts
merely because the speech is offensive); Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3430 (discussing the
potentially broad scope of the Doninger test).
249. Hayes, supra note 102, at 279 (“Giving administrators this sort of unfettered discretion
could potentially chill all juvenile speech.”). See Darin M. Williams, Tinker Operationalized: The
Judiciary’s Practical Answer to Student Cyberspeech, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 125, 152 (2012)
(arguing that “[u]nder the operationalized Tinker standard expounded above, schools clearly have
broad authority” and “[t]his leads to concern that schools have used, and will continue to use, this
wide deference to unconstitutionally infringe upon the First Amendment rights of students”).
250. Miller, supra note 231, at 305 (arguing that “[b]y clinging to Tinker, the Second
Circuit . . . stretched a school’s authority under Tinker”). See Abby Marie Mollen, In Defense of
the “Hazardous Freedom” of Controversial Student Speech, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1501, 1510 (2008)
(stating that the federal appellate courts have “treated school officials as the protagonists and
focused on facilitating their ‘comprehensive authority . . . to prescribe and control conduct in the
schools’ . . . an authority that Tinker recognized but limited”).
251. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (noting that “social media
users employ these websites to engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment activit[ies]”).
See TED, Andrew Blum: What is the Internet, really?, YOUTUBE (Sept. 19, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XE_FPEFpHt4 (discussing how quickly the Internet reaches
across the world and the technology required to post a thought on social media). See generally
Gwenn Schurgin O’Keeffe et al., The Impact of Social Media on Children, Adolescents, and
Families,
127
AMER.
ACAD.
OF
PEDIATRICS
800
(Apr.
2011),
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/127/4/800.full.pdf.
252. Lehnhart, supra note 3 (discussing the widespread use of social media by students); Phillip
Lee, Expanding the Schoolhouse Gate: Public Schools (K-12) and the Regulation of Cyberbullying,
2016 UTAH L. REV. 831, 845 (“[S]ocial media facilitates mass participation in collective dialogues
in virtual communities of interest.”).
253. See Sally A. Specht, The Wavering, Unpredictable Line Between “Speech” and Conduct:
The Expressive Conduct After Young v. New York City Transit Authority, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.
1990), 40 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 173, 187 (1991) (using the factual background in
Young v. New York City Transit Authority as an analogy to categorize spoken speech that is
suggestive, but protected, verses speech that is written and unprotected); Kathryn S. Vander Broek,
Schools and Social Media: First Amendment Issues Arising From Student Use of the Internet, 21
No. 4 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 11, 31 (2009) (discussing how frequently teachers create
assignments based on at-home social media posting and how difficult it is to regulate content that
will be seen by teachers and faculty).
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from fashioning tests pertaining to the Internet due to its vast dimensions
and ability to reach an unlimited number of people.254
2. Sufficient Nexus Threshold to Tinker
The sufficient nexus threshold adopted by the Fourth Circuit in
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools has not been adopted by any other
circuit.255 In Kowalski, the court held that the school was justified in
suspending a student who created a social media account for the purpose
of ridiculing another student.256 Under the test used by the Fourth Circuit
in Kowalski, a school can discipline a student for off-campus speech that
has a sufficient nexus to the school’s pedagogical interests.257 This test
was first articulated in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, but the
speech in Kuhlmeier was a school-sponsored newspaper, rather than a
social media post from a personal account.258 Moreover, it is uncertain
whether the Court in Kuhlmeier could have anticipated its threshold
would apply to off-campus speech, particularly speech posted online.259
The sufficient nexus threshold is overly broad and fails to define what
interests will warrant discipline for off-campus, online speech.260
254. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017); Clay Calvert, Punishing
Public School Students for Bashing Principals, Teachers & Classmates in Cyberspace: The Speech
Issue the Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 210, 235–36 (2010)
(expressing “three reasons why it is reasonably foreseeable that nearly any and all controversial or
provocative speech that is created and posted [online,] off-campus by a student will come to the
attention of school authorities:” (1) tattletale students; (2) curious teachers/administrators; and (3)
in-school buzz/discussion). See Alana Nunez-Garcia, How Much Does Social Media Affect High
School Students?, L.A. TIMES (June 17, 2016), http://highschool.latimes.com/saint-joseph-highschool/how-much-does-social-media-affect-high-school-students/ (explaining how quickly content
on social media travels through students).
255. See Rothman, supra note 73, at 294 (discussing the different approaches the circuits take
when analyzing student speech). Compare Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th
Cir. 2011) (using a sufficient nexus threshold with the Tinker test), with Doninger v. Niehoff, 527
F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2008) (using the reasonably foreseeable and Tinker tests for off-campus
speech), and J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 928 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (using the reasonably foreseeable and Tinker approaches, with an emphasis on intent).
256. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 568.
257. Id. at 573. See generally supra Part I.D.3 (discussing the sufficient nexus test as articulated
by the Fourth Circuit).
258. Compare Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988) (restricting
students’ distribution of a school newspaper), with Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 577 (restricting students’
online speech).
259. Brief of Appellant at 22, Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Pub. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir.
2011) (No. 10–1098), 2010 WL 2380373, at *22 (“[I]n Justice White’s majority opinion [in
Kuhlmeier], the Court recognized that, although the school could censor speech, ‘it could not censor
similar speech outside the school.’”). See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 529 (discussing
the limits to the reach of the Supreme Court’s student speech cases).
260. Kevin Nathaniel Troy Fowler, Tinker Tortured: The Scope of Student Off-Campus Viral
Speech Rights in the Federal Circuits, 104 KY. L.J. 719, 739 (2015) (arguing that “‘pedagogical
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Although its breadth is not as wide as the reasonable foreseeability
approach, schools can justify punishment by setting forth any interest that
promotes the education of students and protects their health and safety.261
The interests articulated in Kowalski were student health and safety
against cyberbullying, but school administrators may choose any interest
that fits the circumstances of the speech.262 For example, if a student
wrote a post on his Facebook profile chastising gay marriage, the
administration could cite the interest of institutional diversity and may
have authority to punish this speech.263
As a school could potentially pick any important interest to justify
regulating off-campus conduct, the articulation of this threshold test may
be overbroad and afford schools too much authority.264 While schools do
have an interest in maintaining efficiency and safety, in order to survive
Packingham scrutiny, the interest must be significant.265 In contrast,
under the sufficient nexus approach, the school administrators could
choose any interest, so long as it is implicated by the speech.266
Therefore, schools can use the sufficient nexus test to justify discipline
interests’ is an extremely vague term that the Court did not spend sufficient time describing”);
Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3431 (arguing this approach is unclear and thus should not be used
to analyze off-campus speech).
261. Compare Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 572 (describing the interest the school had in preventing
bullying), with Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (writing
“deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an ‘important – indeed, perhaps compelling’ interest”),
and Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1986) (stating the school had a
legitimate interest in protecting schoolchildren from lewd and indecent language).
262. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 572. See Calvert, supra note 254, at 251 (describing the number of
interests a school district has in ensuring efficiency).
263. See, e.g., Philip Tegeler, The ‘Compelling Government Interest’ in School Diversity:
Rebuilding the Case for an Affirmative Government Role, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1021, 1023
(2014) (describing the interests schools have in diverse environments: “[p]roviding students with
diverse, inclusive educational opportunities from an early age is crucial to achieving the nation’s
educational and civic goals . . .” (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY AND AVOID RACIAL
ISOLATION IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS 1 (2011))).
264. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3431 (asking “would a school’s interest in shielding its
faculty be sufficient? . . . Or a school’s interest in preserving institutional integrity?”); Kevin P.
Brady, Student-Created Fake Online Profiles Using Social Networking Websites: Protected Online
Speech Parodies or Defamation?, 244 WEST EDUC. L. REP. 907, 908 (2009) (noting that “lower
courts are faced with unclear and often contradictory legal guidelines of how far a school’s legal
authority extends when regulating student cyberspeech”).
265. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). See supra Part II.C
(discussing the level of scrutiny applied in Packingham). In order for a regulation subject to
intermediate scrutiny to be constitutional, it must further an important government interest by
means that are substantially related to that interest. See also Redish, supra note 199, at 128
(describing intermediate scrutiny).
266. See Tegeler, supra note 263, at 1023 (providing examples of important interests schools
can have).
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that would not survive Packingham scrutiny. As such, this test is overly
broad.267
In addition, the sufficient nexus test leaves open the question of what
makes the nexus between off-campus speech and a school’s pedagogical
interests sufficiently strong.268 The sufficient nexus standard may apply
when the speech is directed toward a student, administrator, or event;269
or, when the speech pertains to potential violence.270 But, the court did
not provide specific guidance to determine when this standard would
apply, resulting in possible inconsistent application of the test to different
situations.271 This inconsistent application will likely restrict students’
right to free expression because of the many interests schools could
articulate to justify punishment.272 Further, under Packingham, the Court
made it clear that in order to survive heightened scrutiny, the statute, or
in this case, the threshold test, must be narrowly tailored.273 Stating that
a school administrator needs a sufficient nexus between the speech and
the school’s interests does not define the types of conduct for which
discipline could be justified. Therefore, the test is not narrowly
tailored.274

267. Id. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3431 (noting “[t]he Kowalski court, however,
declined to offer guidance on the types of pedagogical interests that would permit jurisdiction”).
268. See Stephanie Klupinski, Getting Past the Schoolhouse Gate: Rethinking Student Speech
in the Digital Age, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 611, 626 (2010) (describing the inconsistency of the sufficient
nexus test as applied).
269. See, e.g., Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding the
student’s speech was impermissible because it was “aimed at a fellow student” and “created ‘actual
or nascent’ substantial disorder and disruption in the school”) (citations omitted); Doninger v.
Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding a student’s speech was subject to discipline
because it was targeted at the school principal).
270. See, e.g., Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2013)
(holding violent speech is impermissible because a school has an interest in protecting students);
Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding student
speech that embraced violence was not protected due to a school’s interest in preventing attacks).
271. Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3431. For an in-depth critique of the “sufficient nexus”
threshold test, see Tiffany Emrick, When Myspace Crosses the School Gates: The Implications of
Cyberspeech on Students’ Free Speech Rights, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 785, 806–10 (2009).
272. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573 (stating “we need not fully define that limit here, as we are
satisfied that the nexus of Kowalski’s speech to [the school’s interest] was sufficiently strong . . . ”);
Harriet A. Hoder, Supervising Cyberspace: A Simple Threshold for Public School Jurisprudence,
50 B.C. L. REV. 1563, 1585 (2009) (writing “the court still decided to use the less definite ‘sufficient
nexus’ test, presumably to allow for flexibility in applying the student speech jurisprudence,
depending on the facts of the case”).
273. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
274. See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573 (stating that the school needs a sufficient nexus between the
speech and the school, but not defining what is within the scope of the nexus); SMOLLA, supra note
199 (defining intermediate scrutiny).
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3. Intent Precursor to the Reasonable Foreseeability Threshold
While the Third Circuit specifically adopts the reasonable
foreseeability threshold to the Tinker test in off-campus speech cases, the
court is unique in its application.275 In assessing whether it is reasonably
foreseeable that the speech will reach school grounds and cause a
substantial disruption, the court looks at whether the student intended the
speech to make its way onto school grounds and if the student intended
the content of the speech to be taken seriously.276 In J.S. ex rel. Snyder v.
Blue Mountain School District, the court held that because the student did
not intend for his social media account that ridiculed the school’s
principal to reach the school, it could not be reasonably foreseeable that
this speech could cause a substantial disruption.277 In Layshock v.
Hermitage School District, the court held the same under nearly identical
facts.278 The intent requirement for determining whether discipline can
be upheld under Tinker may be difficult in application, but it is a step in
the right direction in protecting students’ First Amendment rights.279
To satisfy the intent requirement, the test requires an express showing
that the student meant for his or her speech to reach the school.280 A
student will likely not admit that he or she intended this speech to reach
275. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (adopting the reasonably foreseeable approach focusing on the student’s intent to determine
if the speech is subject to First Amendment protection); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (applying the same test articulated in Snyder).
276. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 930 (holding the student did not intend to cause a material
disruption because “the profile was so outrageous that no one could have taken it seriously, and no
one did”). See also Rashmi Joshi, Sharing the Digital Sandbox: The Effects of Ubiquitous
Computing on Student Speech and Cyberbullying Jurisprudence, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 629,
657 (2013) (noting “intentional distribution of speech occurs when the student . . . knows to a
substantial certainty that the student’s actions will cause the speech to be distributed inside the
schoolhouse gates”) (quoting Justin P. Markey, Enough Tinkering with Students’ Rights: The Need
for an Enhanced First Amendment Standard to Protect Off-Campus Student Internet Speech, 36
CAP. U. L. REV. 129, 150 (2007)).
277. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 918.
278. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 208. For a comparison between Snyder and Layshock, see Fern L.
Kletter, Annotation, School’s Violation of Parents’ Substantive Due Process Rights Due to Their
Child’s Suspension or Expulsion, 91 A.L.R. 6th 365, II § 4 (2014).
279. See Layshock, 650 F.3d at 219 (“[S]chools may punish expressive conduct that occurs
outside of school, as if it occurred inside the ‘schoolhouse gate,’ under certain very limited
circumstances, none of which are present here.”); Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3433 (“Further
undergirding several opinions is the notion of intentionality . . . [as] for other potential factors, their
role in the analysis is less than clear.”).
280. See, e.g., Snyder, 650 F.3d at 940 (“Regardless of its place of origin, speech intentionally
directed towards a school is properly considered on-campus speech.”). See also Roy Allen Weeks,
The First Amendment, Public School Student, and the Need for Clear Limits on School Officials’
Authority Over Off-Campus Student Speech, 46 GA. L. REV. 1157, 1182 (2012) (discussing that
off-campus speech can be subject to discipline “based on its target audience, whether the audience
receives it, and what the recipients do upon receiving it”).
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the school, and clear evidence to the contrary could be difficult to
establish.281 Therefore, school administrators might have a difficult time
punishing speech without express evidence of an intention to disrupt.282
This express evidence standard results in greater protection of student
speech compared to other approaches.283 For example, the speech in
Wilson, which was unprotected in the Second Circuit, would be protected
under this test due to the precautions taken to make the website private.284
The Third Circuit’s context requirement bolsters students’ rights in the
digital age.285 The intent precursor to the reasonable foreseeability
threshold allows students to speak on social media platforms about
controversial topics without fear of being punished, so long as the speaker
does not intend for the speech to cause a substantial disruption in
school.286 Moreover, if a student intends to cause a substantial disruption
in school based on posts on social media, disciplinary action probably
would be warranted.287 The intent requirement, while broad, creates a
protective layer for students’ online speech.288 If the North Carolina
statute at issue in Packingham would have been written to include
specific language pertaining to a sex offender’s intent to correspond with
281. See, e.g. T.J. Berndt, Transitions in Friendship and Friends’ Influence, in TRANSITIONS
THROUGH ADOLESCENCE: INTERPERSONAL DOMAINS AND CONTEXT 57-84 (J.A. Graber et al.,
eds., 1996) (discussing how school-aged children are significantly influenced by their friends and
social surroundings in making decisions); Valerie Ulene, A Teen’s Friends are a Powerful
Influence, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/11/health/la-he-themd-teens-friends-20110411 (discussing how children’s bad behavior is often to impress friends).
282. In contrast, schools will have an easier time if there is evidence of an actual substantial
disruption. See infra, Part IV (proposing a heightened substantial disruption standard).
283. This standard is more speech protective due to the extra requirement for sustaining
discipline, as opposed to a mere foreseeability approach used by the Second Circuit. Compare
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(vacating a student’s suspension due to lack of intent), with Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48
(2d. Cir. 2008) (upholding a student’s suspension based on foreseeability).
284. In Wilson, the court used a reasonably foreseeable precursor to Tinker to hold a student’s
online speech was impermissible, even though the student undertook privacy precautions to prevent
peers, parents, and administrators from finding the website. 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012). Thus,
under the “intent” approach, the Third Circuit would likely find the students’ conduct permissible.
285. See infra Part IV (proposing that school policies should include a provision that requires a
student to intend for their speech to cause a disruption in the school in order to be subject to
disciplinary action).
286. See, e.g., Layshock, 650 F.3d at 214 (holding because the student did not intend for his
profile, ridiculing the school’s principal, to cause a disruption, it was protected speech); J.S. ex rel.
Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding the same).
287. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919) (stating “[t]he most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic”).
288. See supra note 283 and accompanying text (arguing this threshold is more speech
protective than others); infra Part III.A.4 (discussing how the Ninth Circuit’s approach is arguably
the most speech protective).
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minors, the Court might have ruled it constitutional.289
4. Faced by an Identifiable Threat of School Violence Test
The Ninth Circuit’s threshold test applies a Tinker analysis to offcampus speech only when the speech gives rise to an identifiable threat
of school violence.290 Similar to the Third Circuit approach, this test
affords more protection for student speech.291 This premise is
demonstrated in Wynar v. Douglas County School District.292 In Wynar,
the court upheld a student’s suspension stemming from instant messages
to classmates that threatened a school shooting.293 The court applied
Tinker’s material and substantial disruption standard after determining
that these messages constituted a threat of school violence, placing
special emphasis on the school’s interest in safety. 294 Based on this
reasoning, it is likely that the speech in Doninger, Kowalski, Wilson, and
Snyder would be permissible under the First Amendment.295
While this test advocates for the free expression of students and limits
the authority of administrators, the test as articulated in Wynar does not
encompass speech that schools are entitled to suppress.296 The court fails
to define what constitutes “violence,” whether it be physical violence
toward the school as a whole or emotional violence against a classmate
289. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017) (holding the North
Carolina statute is unconstitutional because it is too broad with no mens rea requirement).
290. See Wynar v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2013). See also
Fowler, supra note 260, at 730 (noting the Ninth Circuit approach is “highly protective of student
speech, and can thus be deemed the most protective of any of those tests developed by other
circuits”).
291. See supra notes 283, 288 and accompanying text (describing the Third Circuit’s “intent”
threshold as speech protective).
292. Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1062.
293. Id. at 1065.
294. Given the knowledge the shootings at Columbine, Thurston and Santee high schools,
among others, have imparted about the potential for school violence . . . we must take care
when evaluating a student’s First Amendment right of free expression against school
officials’ need to provide a safe school environment not to overreact in favor of either.
Id. at 1069–70. See also KERN ALEXANDER, THE LAW OF SCHOOLS, STUDENTS AND TEACHERS
IN A NUTSHELL 163 (West Academic ed., 5th ed. 2015) (discussing how in Wynar, the court held
“school officials do not have to wait for a substantial disruption to occur before taking action”).
295. The speech at issue in these cases would be permissible under the First Amendment
because in each instance there was not an identifiable threat of violence, just offensive speech. See
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 653 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011) (the speech was hateful toward
a peer); S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 School District 696 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir.
2011) (the blog post was sexually explicit); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School Dist., 650
F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (the speech ridiculed the school’s principal); Doninger v.
Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d. Cir. 2008) (the speech ridiculed the school’s principal).
296. Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1068 (holding Tinker may only apply when the speech involves
violence, but not identifying what test would apply if the speech was not violent).
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through cyberbullying.297 In this case, it seems that the test only
encompasses physical harm, forgetting the substantial and detrimental
effects that cyberbullying has on students and the school environment.298
Still, by declining to extend Tinker to off-campus speech involving
anything except threats of school violence, the Ninth Circuit’s test better
protects students’ First Amendment rights than other circuits’ tests, and
is more in line with the reasoning in Packingham and Reno.299 Because
this a content-based restriction on speech, it is subject to strict scrutiny.300
In disciplining a student for speech on social media that the school thinks
is an identifiable threat of school violence, the school would have to prove
that this discipline is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
interest.301 Certainly, protecting students from violence would be a
compelling interest.302 However, because “violence” is not defined in the
test, it would likely not be narrowly tailored to further that interest.303 If
the Ninth Circuit defined what encompasses an identifiable threat of
school violence, this test would be consistent with strict scrutiny, the

297. Id.; Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3432 (arguing that “if the Wynar test is intended to
encompass only threats of serious bodily harm, it is uncertain why the line should arbitrarily be
drawn there”).
298. Not only does bullying affect students during adolescence, but studies show the effects of
bullying last long into adulthood. Alice G. Walton, The Psychological Effects of Bullying Last Well
Into
Adulthood,
FORBES
(Feb.
21,
2013,
12:17
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/alicegwalton/2013/02/21/the-psychological-effects-of-bullying-lastwell-into-adulthood-study-finds/#4aee11f91592. See Nicholas Bakalar, Being Bullied Is Bad for
Your
Health,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
12,
2014,
3:08
PM),
https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/12/being-bullied-is-bad-for-your-health/
(analyzing
studies about the effects of bullying and calling for a legislative response).
299. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties
Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1998). See Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069 (holding Tinker does not apply
absent a threat of violence).
300. Montroll, supra note 173, at 500 (discussing content-based restrictions, and noting that
while strict scrutiny always mandates the same test, courts often come to different conclusions
based on similar facts). See Reno, 521 U.S. at 858 (holding a content-based statute
unconstitutional).
301. See Blum, supra note 174 (discussing strict scrutiny as applied to content-based
restrictions). See also infra Part IV (proposing a model school policy that will pass strict scrutiny,
although it is typically looked upon with disfavor).
302. For a look at the compelling interests schools have after the April 20, 1999, shooting at
Columbine High School, see William C. Nevin, Neither Tinker, Nor Hazelwood, Nor Fraser, Nor
Morse: Why Violent Student Assignments Represent a Unique First Amendment Challenge?, 23
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 785 (2015).
303. In Reno, the Supreme Court held that the content-based restriction was not narrowly
tailored because the words “lewd” and “obscene” were not defined in the statute. 521 U.S. 844, 870
(1997). Specifically, the Court wrote, “indecency has not been defined to exclude works of serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value.” Id. at 863 (emphasis in original). This reasoning can
be instructive for the Ninth Circuit critique. Because “violence” is not defined, it cannot serve to
exclude acts that should be impermissible, but are not per the statute.
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reasoning in Reno, and the holding in Packingham.304
5. The Fifth Circuit’s Case-by-Case Approach
In Bell v. Itawamba County School Board, the Fifth Circuit specifically
declined to adopt a test to apply to future cases, but ruled on the matter
based on the individual facts of the case.305 The majority’s reasoning
allows Tinker to apply to off-campus speech when: “(a) a student
intentionally directs speech at the school community, and (b) when the
speech is reasonably understood by school officials to threaten, harass,
and intimidate a teacher.”306 This test is flawed because it limits
disciplinary action to speech directed at teachers and does not provide a
rule for deciding future cases.307
The first prong of the test—that the student intentionally directs speech
at the school—is similar to the Third Circuit’s intent precursor, and is
thus subject to the same praise and criticism.308 As to the second prong
of the test, Judge Dennis in a dissenting opinion criticized this as a
content-based restriction, and argued that permissibility hinges on the
listener’s idiosyncratic interpretation of the speech.309 This vague
standard will result in inconsistent First Amendment protections.310 This
304. For a commentary regarding the importance of defining terms in a statute or policy, see
Jeanne Price, Wagging, Not Barking, (Univ. of Nevada, Las Vegas Sch. of Law Scholarly Works
Grp.,
Paper
No.
764),
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1786&context=facpub.
305. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 410 (5th Cir. 2015) (Dennis, J.,
dissenting) (“[a]s an initial matter, I am compelled to point out that the majority opinion’s test
unabashedly adopts almost the precise wording of the Itawamba County School Board’s
disciplinary policy”).
306. Id. at 396. The majority opinion argues this test is consistent with the Fifth Circuit
precedent in Shanley, Sullivan, and Porter. See Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608,
619 (5th Cir. 2004) (analyzing the speech at issue under Tinker, but noting the circuit split regarding
off-campus speech); Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 475 F.2d 1071, 1076 (5th Cir. 1973)
(applying a traditional Tinker analysis without any threshold); Shanley v. N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
Bexar Cty., Tex., 462 F.2d 960, 974–75 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying a traditional Tinker analysis).
307. Bell, 799 F.3d at 400. See Aleaha Jones, Schools, Speech, and Smartphones: Online Speech
and the Evolution of the Tinker Standard, 15 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 155, 167–70 (analyzing what
the outcome of Bell would be under a true threat test and a traditional Tinker analysis, while
providing a critique of the majority’s test laid out in Bell).
308. See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing the intent threshold to Tinker as speech protective: “[t]he
intent precursor to the reasonable foreseeability threshold allows students to speak on social media
platforms about controversial topics without the fear of being punished, so long as the speaker does
not intend for the speech to cause a substantial disruption”); see also supra notes 283–289 and
accompanying text.
309. Bell, 799 F.3d at 410 (Dennis, J., dissenting); see Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521
U.S. 844, 870 (1998) (stating content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny); Blum, supra
note 174 (discussing content-based restrictions on speech and the analysis resulting therefrom).
310. Bell, 799 F.3d at 391 (explaining that student speech issues should be decided with a
bright-line rule, stating “student-speech claims are evaluated ‘in light of the special characteristics
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content-based restriction likely would not withstand strict scrutiny under
Reno because while protection of teachers might be a compelling
government interest, the means are certainly not narrowly tailored to
achieve this purpose.311 The court additionally failed to define what
speech is intended to be subject to punishment; thus, the test is too
broad.312
However, the most problematic part of this test is that it only pertains
to speech directed at teachers, leaving out entirely offensive speech made
toward peers.313 While a blog post harassing a teacher at a school would
be subject to discipline, assuming all the other elements of the test are
satisfied, the same post about a student could be permissible under this
test.314 In this regard, the Fifth Circuit deemphasizes the harmful effects
of cyberbullying on students.315
of the school environment, beginning by categorizing the student speech at issue’”) (quoting
Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 375 (5th Cir. 2011)). As one commentator put it, “the Fifth
Circuit’s Bell . . . decision misapplies Tinker and creates even more ambiguity with its vague
exception.” Katherine E. Geddes, First Amendment – Student Speech – Why Bell Tolls a Review of
Tinker’s Application to Off-Campus, Online Speech, 69 SMU L. REV. 275, 281 (2016).
311. Bell, 799 F.3d at 399. See Leets, supra note 182, at 299 (discussing Reno’s application to
online hate speech). While the Leets article does not address the facts of Bell, it is instructive in
evaluating circumstances in which online hate speech would not be protected.
312. Bell, 799 F.3d at 399. See Price, supra note 304, at 1000 (discussing the importance of
defining terms in statutes in order to prevent litigation and confusion in executing a statute). For
another interpretation of the reasoning in Kowalski, see Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3431
(articulating that the test set forth in Kowalski in practice is the same as the test articulated in
Doninger and adopted by the Second and Eighth circuits, stating “the standard is susceptible to the
same criticism that the Doninger test warrants”).
313. The court in Bell articulated the Tinker test as follows:
Accordingly, in the light of our court’s precedent, we hold Tinker governs our analysis,
as in this instance, when a student intentionally directs at the school community speech
reasonably understood by school officials to threaten, harass, and intimidate a teacher,
even when such speech originated, and was disseminated, off-campus without the use of
school resources.
Bell, 799 F.3d at 396. The test notably neglects to address speech that threatens, harasses, and
intimidates a student. See Shaver, supra note 15, at 1573 (discussing problems with the test
articulated by the majority and advocating for the Supreme Court to hear a case to resolve this
issue).
314. The court may have ruled in this manner due to the school policy’s language. The court
states, “the school-district’s policy demonstrates an awareness of Tinker’s substantial-disruption
standard, and the policy’s violation can be used as evidence” supporting the discipline. Bell, 799
F.3d at 399.
315. See supra note 288 and accompanying text (describing the harmful effects of cyberbullying
carried into adulthood). However, many states have enacted cyberbullying laws to combat the issue
of violence against students. See Alison Virginia King, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws:
Keeping the Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 884
(2010) (focusing on how cyberbullying laws fit within the realm of Supreme Court student speech
cases, concluding that “[u]ntil the Supreme Court clarifies the authority of schools over online
speech, legislators and educators must respond to cyberbullying in a way that avoids restricting
students’ free speech rights”).
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It is evident that the federal appellate courts need the Supreme Court
to articulate a uniform test in order to properly address this pressing
issue.316 In the meantime, school districts should take matters into their
own hands, borrowing some of the tests the various circuits employed to
craft their own social media policies.317 In order to do so, it is useful to
study individual school policies to discover what speech schools find
inside the scope of discipline, and what speech is afforded protection.318
B. Analyzing School Social Media Policies
Off-campus student speech jurisprudence is in disarray. 319 Absent
guidance from the Supreme Court, the federal appellate courts have
distorted the framework of Tinker to apply their own, inconsistent
analyses to fit the facts before them.320 While some appellate courts
interpret the Court’s holdings in cases involving student speech occurring
inside the school to apply to speech occurring outside the school, this may
be looking too liberally at these holdings.321 Some public school
guidelines, which regulate students’ use of social media outside the
schoolhouse, are impermissible blanket restrictions on speech masked by
316. This statement has been articulated throughout many scholarly articles discussing the
issue. See David L. Hudson, Jr., Time for the Supreme Court to Address Off-Campus, Online
Student Speech, 91 OR. L. REV. 621, 625 (2012) (arguing for the Supreme Court to address the
issue and analyzing the inconsistent rulings based on the federal appellate court tests); Shaver,
supra note 15, at 1573 (advocating for the Court to address off-campus online speech and providing
a model test for the Supreme Court to use when it does so).
317. See infra Part IV (providing a model threshold for schools to implement while drafting
policies pertaining to social media).
318. See infra Part III.B (analyzing the potential constitutional issues by considering each
school policy with a Packingham and Reno lens, applying the Court’s reasoning).
319. See supra Part III.A (considering the constitutionality of the many threshold tests to Tinker
adopted by the federal courts of appeals). For an example of why this jurisprudence is in disarray,
compare Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d. Cir. 2008) (using the reasonable foreseeability
threshold and upholding the punishment for an off-campus blog post), with Layshock ex rel.
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (using the intent
threshold to vacate the punishment for an off-campus blog post). Based on nearly the same facts,
the Second Circuit and the Third Circuit had completely different holdings.
320. Scott Dranoff has noted the inconsistency in holdings as a result of numerous tests:
These tests include abandonment of the Tinker test in off-campus speech cases,
application of the Tinker test with additional restrictions, various methods of determining
the speaker’s intended place of dissemination, and frameworks for determining what
types of off-campus speech may be regulated under restrictions for on-campus speech.
Dranoff, supra note 108, at 652.
321. See Mary Noe, Sticks and Stones Will Break My Bones but Whether Words Harm Will Be
Decided by a Judge, 88 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 39, 40 (2016) (discussing that judges have frequently
decided whether punishment for student speech is permissible, a decision that should be left to the
legislature). But see Watt Lesley Black, Jr., Omnipresent Student Speech and the Schoolhouse
Gate: Interpreting Tinker in the Digital Age, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 531, 551 (2015) (arguing that
the reasonably foreseeable test is speech protective and judges do not over-extend their authority).
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language consistent with Tinker.322 These overbroad policies leave
students confused and give administrators too much power to decide what
constitutes permissible expression and what should be subject to
discipline.323 These social media policies, discussed in this Section,
would most likely be found impermissible under Reno and Packingham
because they are not narrow enough to survive the scrutiny the Supreme
Court applied in those cases.324
1. Jordan-Elbridge Central School District
Jordan-Elbridge Central School District in Jordan, New York, enacted
a social media policy in 2010 that severely limits students’ right to free
speech on social media.325 Specifically, the policy requires students to
“refrain from reporting, speculating, discussing or giving any opinions on
topics related to the Jordan-Elbridge Central School District or students
of the district that could be considered sensitive, confidential or
disparaging.”326 The policy includes fourteen restrictions on students’
personal use of social media, and states that failure to abide by these rules
could result in disciplinary action.327 Because the policy fails to define
the type of speech subject to discipline, it serves as an impermissible
content-based and content-neutral restriction on speech.328
322. See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the Pottsville Area School District’s policy, in which the
language is consistent with the language found in Tinker). For an example of the problems schools
face when attempting to regulate social media, see Jon Camp, I-Team: School fights fuel debate
over social media policies, ABC (May 4, 2017), http://abc11.com/news/school-fights-fuel-debateover-social-media-policies-/1952960/.
323. Cathryn Rudolph, Unleashing Law Reviews Onto Social Media: Preventing Mishaps with
a Social-Media Policy, 30 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 187, 187 (2013) (arguing that “[l]aw reviews can
successfully implement a social-media plan and avoid mishaps by informing students what is
expected, what is prohibited, and how they will be held accountable”). Although this statement
pertains to students in graduate schools, its argument applies to students in secondary school as
well. Id.
324. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to a content-neutral policy); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1998)
(applying strict scrutiny to a content-based policy).
325. Jordan-Elbridge Central School District is located in upstate New York, in between
Rochester and Syracuse in Onondaga County. For a statistical look at its test scores and
comparisons to other public schools in the state of New York, see Evans et al., New York School
Test Scores, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/new-yorkschools-test-scores/counties/onondaga/districts/jordan-elbridge-central-school-district.
326. Jordan-Elbridge Social Media Policy, supra note 162 (providing a content-based
restriction subject to strict scrutiny under Reno).
327. Id. These fourteen restrictions are limited to conduct on personal social media profiles.
Although the school “does not routinely monitor personal online accounts,” it reserves the right to
address issues that violate the policy. Id.
328. Id. The policy requires students to refrain from posting on social media anything that can
be considered sensitive, confidential, or disparaging. However, the policy fails to define any of
these terms. The Court held in Reno that because the statute did not define the words necessary to
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2. Pottsville Area School District
The Pottsville Area School District enacted a particularly restrictive
social media policy in 2011.329 The detailed policy restricts certain forms
of social media: blogs, social networking sites, media-sharing sites, and
virtual worlds.330 Specifically, the policy limits the content on each of
these platforms when the subject matter is sensitive to students and
employees, and/or when the content is used for bullying, a defamatory or
discriminatory purpose, threats, and/or illegal activities.331 The policy
also borrows the Tinker language and bans students from posting on
social media any content that disrupts the school or the rights of others.332
Moreover, the policy cautions students from using exaggeration, humor,
and characterizations.333 Any student who violates these rules will be
subject to discipline.334
This is a content-based restriction, and under the Supreme Court
holdings regarding the Internet, it is subject to strict scrutiny. 335 While
the interest will probably be considered compelling, the policy may not
hold someone accountable for violating the statute, it did not withstand strict scrutiny. Reno, 521
U.S. at 860; see also Jacques, supra note 176, at 1982 (stating “[b]y failing to narrowly tailor the
language of the statute . . . Congress passed an act that was dangerously vague and clearly
unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny analysis”).
329. Pottsville Area School District is located in Pottsville, Pennsylvania, outside of Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania. As such, it is within the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit. See supra Parts I.D.2,
III.A.3 (discussing the Third Circuit threshold test as applied to off-campus student speech); see
also Best High Schools: Pennsylvania: Districts: Pottsville Area High School: Rankings, U.S.
NEWS
2017,
https://www.usnews.com/education/best-highschools/pennsylvania/districts/pottsville-area-sd/pottsville-area-high-school-17290 (last visited
Mar. 30, 2018) (providing information about the district’s rankings, scholarly performance, and
demographics).
330. Pottsville Social Media Policy, supra note 162 (listing blogs, microblogs, social networks,
media sharing, Wikis, virtual worlds, email, and text messaging as encompassed by the term “social
media”).
331. Compare Pottsville Social Media Policy, supra note 162, at ¶ 4 (stating that students must
not promote illegal drugs, activities, or violence), with Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401
(2007) (holding speech that promotes illegal activity does not deserve First Amendment
protection).
332. Specifically, the policy states, “[s]tudents may not disrupt the learning atmosphere,
educational programs, school activities, and the rights of others.” Pottsville Social Media Policy,
supra note 162, at ¶ 1. In Tinker, the Supreme Court ruled that conduct that “materially involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others” does not deserve First Amendment
protection. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). Thus, the
policy mimics the rule set forth in Tinker, but applies it to off-campus speech.
333. Pottsville Social Media Policy, supra note 162, at ¶ 4 (stating “students should be cautious
when they use exaggeration, colorful language, guesswork, derogatory remarks, humor, and
characterizations . . . ”).
334. Id.
335. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997). See Montroll, supra note
173, at 500 (providing a background on content-based restrictions and examples of statutes and
policies that were upheld under the standard, and those that were struck down).
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be written narrowly enough to survive heightened scrutiny due to its
blanket restrictions, similar to Packingham, on student speech.336
However, because the policy includes definitions and examples of
content inside the scope of authority, it might meet the narrow tailoring
requirement.337 But, the school district still must prove that this
regulation is the least restrictive means to achieve its stated interest.338
Because this policy restricts nearly all content on social media that could
cause a disturbance, it encompasses too much speech.339 To withstand
strict scrutiny and fall in line with Reno and Packingham, this policy
should be rewritten with less restrictive language.340
3. Berkeley County School District
The Berkeley County School District does not have a specific social
media policy, but within its student conduct manual is a provision that
encompasses off-campus student speech.341 The provision states that
students’ off-campus conduct that is reasonably foreseeable to cause a
disruption is subject to punishment.342 However, the only example listed
within the policy that falls under this scope of authority is student social
media postings for the purpose of inviting others to engage in disruptive
and hateful conduct toward another student.343 By only listing one
336. Pottsville Social Media Policy, supra note 162. In addressing content-based and contentneutral regulations, the Court has typically upheld the government’s interest as compelling or
important. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (finding the
government’s interest in protecting minor children important).
337. Pottsville Social Media Policy, supra note 162. It is specific in that it defines the types of
social media covered by the policy, and if it was considered a content-neutral regulation on speech,
it might meet the requirements for intermediate scrutiny. See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738.
However, because it is a content-based restriction, the definitions should cover not only the fora
that are subject to restriction, but the subject matters as well.
338. For a look at what it takes for a regulation or policy to pass the “least restrictive means”
test, see Alan O. Sykes, The Least Restrictive Means, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 403 (2003).
339. Pottsville Social Media Policy, supra note 162.
340. See, e.g., Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1738 (holding a statute unconstitutional because it
restricts lawful speech as a means to prevent unlawful speech); Reno, 521 U.S. at 868 (holding a
restriction on speech must not suppress too much speech).
341. Berkeley Policy, supra note 163. Berkeley County School District is located in South
Carolina and was the defendant in Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
See supra Part I.D.3 (discussing the Kowalski decision).
342. Berkeley Policy, supra note 163, at 27. See supra Part III.A.1 (analyzing the
constitutionality of the reasonably foreseeable threshold to Tinker).
343. Berkeley’s Student Handbook states:
Students’ off-campus conduct that might reasonably be expected to cause disruption in
the school is prohibited and may result in disciplinary action. This includes, but is not
limited to, blogs and social media postings created for the purpose of inviting others to
indulge in disruptive and hateful conduct toward a student or staff member.
Berkeley Policy, supra note 163, at 27. For further discussion regarding a student’s intent to cause
a disruption, see supra Part III.A.3 (discussing the Third Circuit’s intent threshold to Tinker,
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example of speech within the scope of discipline, this policy is too broad,
and leaves out examples of speech that the school is entitled to curtail,
such as threats of physical violence.344 Furthermore, because any online
speech is reasonably foreseeable to make its way to school grounds,
punishment of protected political speech that causes a disruption could
curtail students’ First Amendment rights.345
Although this policy is on the right track toward being specific enough
to achieve the school’s interest, in order to meet the threshold and fit
within the holding in Packingham, the policy must be more narrow to
encompass the types of speech that the school has authority to
discipline.346 This school policy potentially limits more speech than
necessary and, as such, the policy is under-inclusive and is not narrowly
tailored to achieve an important interest.347
C. The “Chilling Effect” Stemming from Restrictive Threshold Tests
and Limiting School Policies
The circuit split regarding whether Tinker can apply to off-campus
speech, and to what end it does apply, has led to confusion in the
courtroom.348 But, how has it affected students outside the classroom?349
The conduct of the students in Kowalski and Layshock is very similar, but
considering its positives and negatives).
344. The Second Circuit in Wisniewski refused to apply a “true threat” approach because
“school officials have significantly broader authority to sanction student speech than the [true
threat] standard allows.” Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d
34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007). This type of thinking could encompass the Berkeley County School District
policy, as the school district has authority to discipline more than what is explicitly listed in the
policy, such as threats of death or serious bodily harm.
345. See supra Part III.A.1 (critiquing the “reasonably foreseeable” threshold to the Tinker test
in greater detail).
346. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (holding the statute
unconstitutional and inviting the North Carolina legislature to craft a more narrowly written statute
to withstand strict scrutiny).
347. Compare Berkeley Policy, supra note 163, at 27 (limiting off-campus social media speech
that is reasonably expected to cause a substantial disruption, potentially limiting too much speech),
with Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (holding that the statute limiting social media was
unconstitutional because it limited too much speech).
348. See supra Part I.D (discussing the circuit split and the tests each circuit uses to address offcampus speech); supra Part III.A (analyzing the different approaches taken by the circuits); see
also Calve, supra note 82, at 386 (arguing for the need for the Supreme Court to put an end to the
circuit inconsistency).
349. When policies regarding social media use are vague, students might refuse to speak their
mind due to fear of punishment. Justice Kennedy articulated the concept of a chilling effect in
Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission: “Prolix laws chill speech for the same reason
that vague laws chill speech: People ‘of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [the law’s]
meaning and differ as to its application.’” 558 U.S. 310, 324 (2010) (quoting Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).

2018]

Interpretation of “Social Media”

769

their holdings are contradictory.350 The student in Kowalski created a
social media profile to post hateful messages about another student and
the Fourth Circuit upheld the student’s suspension.351 The student in
Layshock created a social media profile to post hateful messages about
the school’s principal and the Third Circuit vacated the student’s
suspension.352 The only difference was the target of the online speech.353
Unfortunately for some students, the social media policies adopted by
their school districts are likely to have a chilling effect on off-campus
expression.354 In a dissenting opinion in Bell v. Itawamba County School
Board, Judge Harris wrote: “for students whose performance at school
largely determines their fate in the future, even the specter of punishment
will likely deter them from engaging in off-campus expression that could
be deemed controversial or hurtful to school officials.”355 How can a
student know that what he or she writes on a personal account is
something that a school administrator might find to be a substantial
disruption to the school environment?356 While it is important to ensure
the school environment is safe, it cannot be at the cost of students’ First
Amendment rights.357
The tests employed by each circuit are subjective, given the factspecific nature of Tinker.358 Because the determination of the substantial
350. Compare Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 653 F.3d 565, 577 (4th Cir. 2011) (using the
“sufficient nexus” precursor to Tinker), with Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist.,
650 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (using the intent precursor to Tinker).
351. Kowalski, 653 F.3d at 567; see supra note 116 and accompanying text (explaining the
students’ speech).
352. Layshock, 650 F.3d at 210; see supra note 112 and accompanying text (explaining the
students’ speech).
353. See supra Parts I.D.2, I.D.3 (discussing the court’s reasoning in Layshock and Kowalski,
respectively).
354. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (stating that these standards imposed by the courts “would risk ensnaring any off-campus
expression that happened to discuss school related matters”); Kinsley, supra note 178, at 258
(discussing the “chilling effect” and tracing its background).
355. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 421 (5th Cir. 2015) (“What will be the direct
consequence of these various layers of vagueness upon students’ First Amendment freedoms? ‘[I]t
will operate to chill or suppress the exercise of those freedoms by reason of vague terms or
overbroad coverage.’”) (quoting Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117, 131 (2011)).
356. See Pottsville Social Media Policy, supra note 162, at ¶ 5 (restricting social media speech
that could foreseeably cause a disruption in the school); supra note 337 and accompanying text
(describing how students will refrain from speaking if policies are not explicit).
357. Hughes, supra note 143, at 220 (advocating for a balance between students’ rights and
schools’ authority).
358. Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3399:
Specifically, the Supreme Court has granted public school officials considerable
authority to regulate student expression within the school community. . . . School
authority to regulate student speech is typically justified based on the “special
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disruption, foreseeability, or potential violence tests depends almost
entirely on the facts in the specific cases, students are left in the dark as
to the limits within which they can express themselves.359 Due to the risk
of chilled speech, schools need to respond by creating policies that take
not only the circumstances behind certain speech into account, but also
the intent of the speaker and the content of the speech. Such an approach
will maintain fairness and encourage free expression, especially during
the cyber era.360
IV. PROPOSAL
Public schools have an interest in promoting safety, order, and the
well-being of students, while students have an interest in protecting their
First Amendment rights.361 When these two interests conflict, there needs
to be a clearly articulated standard that balances both.362 Student speech
that occurs inside the school should be analyzed with the Tinker
standard,363 but students’ online speech occurring off-campus cannot be
subject to the same limitations.364 Packingham held that social media is
characteristics” of the school environment and the unique role of public schools in
developing the nation’s youth.
See Barry P. McDonald, Regulating Student Cyberspeech, 77 MO. L. REV. 727, 752 (2012) (noting
the circuit split “created a situation where courts seem to be permitting or disallowing cyberspeech
according to their subjective views of whether students should be allowed to engage in it or not”)
(emphasis added).
359. See supra Part III.A (analyzing the foreseeability and potential violence approaches);
supra note 356 and accompanying text (discussing the confusion plaguing students when they do
not know what type of speech is subject to restrictions).
360. See infra Part IV (proposing a standard that schools should follow when implementing
social media policies). See also School District Affirms Student Speech Rights After Tenth Grader
Punished for ‘Gay? Fine By Me’ T-Shirt, NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 6, 2007),
https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/school-district-affirms-student-speech-rights-after-10thgrader-punished-gay-fine-me (quoting a student on censorship issues: “you cannot cure this chill”).
361. See Calvert, supra note 254, at 251 (noting the need for a clear test to “strike[] a proper
balance between the First Amendment speech rights of off-campus minors and the need of schools
to function smoothly and effectively as educational institutions will be a prodigious and staggering
task”); supra note 261 and accompanying text (comparing the interests of schools in cases before
the courts).
362. Landfried, supra note 131, at 200 (discussing the need for a balance between authority and
students’ freedoms). See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 389–90 (5th Cir. 2015)
(noting the necessity of balancing the constitutional rights of students with the need to protect
teachers and principals).
363. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (defining the
substantial and material disruption requirement in deciding students’ free speech rights on school
grounds). See Ceglia, supra note 24, at 950 (noting the Supreme Court has not declared that Tinker
applies to off-campus speech).
364. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 936 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (Smith, C.J., concurring) (arguing Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech and that “the
First Amendment protects students engaging in off-campus speech to the same extent it protects
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protected speech, but government—in this case, a school district—may
pass policies to limit usage so long as the means are substantially related
to the school’s important interest.365 Similarly, Reno illustrated that
content-based restrictions on Internet speech must be analyzed under the
strict scrutiny test.366 The holdings in Reno and Packingham can be used
to guide school districts enacting policies governing social media use
occurring outside school grounds.367
Because every school district has different needs and interests, this
Comment explores a standard for schools to keep in mind while crafting
policies that fit the needs of the school, rather than suggesting every
school district should use one specific policy. This proposed standard will
first consider whether the speech occurred on- or off-campus.368 If the
speech occurred off-campus, the speech must have actually caused a
material and substantial disruption, unless a ‘true threat’ can be proven,
in which case the school will have the authority to punish the speech
without proof of a disruption.369 If the speech did cause a material and
substantial disruption, the school must then determine the speaker’s
intent—specifically, whether he or she purposely caused the disruption
in school—which can be achieved by looking at the content and form of
the speech.370
A. Defining the Geographical Limits for Speech: On- or Off-Campus?
The first question to address to determine whether the speech can be
subject to discipline is where the speech occurred.371 As articulated in
Tinker, the authority to discipline speech is limited to on-campus speech
or, as Morse held, school-sponsored events.372 A clear indication of onspeech by citizens in the community at large”).
365. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (articulating that contentneutral regulations on speech are subject to intermediate scrutiny). See also Redish, supra note 199,
at 128 (describing intermediate scrutiny).
366. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1998).
367. See supra Part II (discussing the factual background and reasoning in Reno and
Packingham); see also Klinker, supra note 196 (noting that after Packingham, social media is
considered protected speech).
368. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the jurisdictional limits of authority to discipline).
369. See infra Part IV.B.1 (advocating for a heightened material and substantial disruption
standard, unless it can be proven that the speech amounts to a “true threat”).
370. See infra Part IV.C (determining the jurisdictional limits of authority to discipline).
371. This is important because it determines what test the speech will be subject to: Tinker or
the proposed standard set forth in this Comment. The Second and Fourth circuits have adopted this
geographical test. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing the different
tests applied to on- and off-campus speech); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th
Cir. 2011) (holding off-campus speech is subject to greater protection than on-campus speech).
372. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (holding students
do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,”
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campus online speech would be if a student uses a school computer on
school grounds to post a threatening message on his or her Facebook
profile.373 In contrast, off-campus speech encompasses all speech
written, spoken, or posted online occurring off-campus, outside school
hours, and not at any school-sponsored event.374 Consider a hypothetical
situation in which a student uses her personal cell phone to write a
Facebook post in the school’s parking lot during a lunch break.375 This
type of speech would be considered on-campus speech.376 In contrast, a
post that is made while the same student is walking to school, not yet on
school property and before school hours begin, would be considered offcampus speech.377 If schools clearly articulate the difference between offcampus and on-campus speech, it will be easier for students to know
when their speech will likely be protected and schools will be able to
easily determine what analysis to conduct when assessing if the student
should be punished.378
B. Substantial and Material Disruption Plus
If speech is deemed to be off-campus, the next step is to determine

but limiting its discussion to on-campus speech).
373. The model policy relating to this on-campus speech could be written as: “On-Campus
Student Speech: A student may be subject to disciplinary action for any speech verbally spoken,
written, or posted through the Internet occurring during school hours, on a school computer, or at
a school-sponsored event when the speech materially and substantially disrupts the school
environment.” See also Berkeley Policy, supra note 163, at 21–22 (articulating a separate policy
for acceptable use of school technology and computer systems).
374. Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion in Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, alluded to
the premise that off-campus speech is subject to different limitations, noting: “If respondent had
given the same speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been penalized simply
because government officials considered his language to be inappropriate.” 478 U.S. 675, 688
(1986) (Brennan, J., concurring); but see Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 419 (2007) (extending
the jurisdiction of school authorities to discipline student speech to off-campus, school-sponsored
events).
375. This would be considered on-campus speech because it occurred on school property and
during school hours. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 424 (providing a policy perspective on this limitation:
“[d]uring school hours . . . parents are not present to provide protection and guidance . . .”); Porter
v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 619 (5th Cir. 2004) (advocating for a clear delineation
of geographical limits for protected student speech).
376. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (holding speech that occurred on campus is subject to lower
protection); supra note 375 and accompanying text (comparing cases with geographical standards).
377. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688 (noting the differences in protection speech receives when it occurs
on campus or off campus). See generally Fronk, supra note 227, at 1438 (providing examples of
off-campus speech).
378. Rudolph, supra note 323, at 187 (discussing the importance of clear policies so “students
know what is expected, what is prohibited, and how they will be held accountable”). For an example
of policies that do not meet this standard, see supra Part III.B (analyzing the broad policies that
leave students confused and chill student speech).
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whether it actually caused a substantial and material disruption.379 Unless
there is an actual disruption to the school environment, there is not a
strong enough nexus to give administrators the authority to justify
reaching outside the schoolhouse gate and into the free speech rights of
these students.380 Courts have struggled to define what speech rises to the
level of a material and substantial disruption, which has led to a skewed
delineation between what constitutes a substantial and material disruption
and what constitutes an insignificant one.381 Therefore, defining these
terms is critical if these proposed standards are to withstand any level of
scrutiny.382
Substantial is defined as having “considerable importance, size, or
worth and not imaginary or illusory.” 383 Material is “having real
importance or great consequences.”384 Many courts have relied on a
student’s or a teacher’s negative feelings or mere school gossip to justify
their determination that the speech was a material and substantial
disruption.385 By including the definitions of material and substantial in
school policies, schools are given clear guidelines for making disciplinary
decisions without having to base them on the subjective feelings of the
target of the speech.386 Further, defining what constitutes a material and
substantial disruption precludes discipline for any trivial or offensive
conduct that did not cause any harm to the school environment.387 For
379. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (originating the
“substantial and material” disruption test); but see supra Part III.A (critiquing the additional
threshold tests applied to Tinker by the federal courts that dilute Tinker’s framework).
380. Willard, supra note 214, at 312 (“[a] complication of the boundless nature of the internet
emerges when a student is disciplined before the speech has the opportunity to affect the school”).
381. Levin, supra note 25, at 889 (“[t]he current ad hoc approach to determining whether a
school district can reasonably forecast substantial disruption to the school environment has resulted
in unpredictable, and therefore unfair, decisions”); see also J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (providing that “[t]hose officials involved in
the educational process perform important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions . . . the
authority of public school officials is not boundless, however”) (emphasis added).
382. Price, supra note 304 (discussing the importance of defining terms and providing clear
guidelines in order to protect the statute’s true intent). See Rudolph, supra note 323, at 199 (arguing
that defining terms in social media policies is critical to ensure students have knowledge of what is
and is not tolerated).
383. Substantial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, (11th ed. 2017).
384. Material, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, (11th ed. 2017).
385. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2008) (placing special emphasis on the
principal’s feelings and opinion alone to uphold the student’s discipline); but see J.S. ex rel. H.S.
v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 863–64 (Pa. 2002) (noting that the teacher’s feelings
were important, but it was because the offended feelings contributed to a leave of absence that the
speech created a material and substantial disruption).
386. See supra notes 381–382 and accompanying text (explaining the inconsistent results due
to undefined tests).
387. Marcus-Toll, supra note 23, at 3434 (arguing “to be sufficient to justify school discipline
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example, a student’s blog post about how much he despised a teacher that
caused mere chatter in the school and emotional distress to the teacher,
but did not cause a greater negative effect on the school environment,
would garner First Amendment protection.388 In contrast, the derogatory
comments about a teacher in J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School
District left her unable to complete the school year due to severe stress
stemming from the specific post.389 This affected students due to the loss
of a cohesive curriculum plan because of the influx of different substitute
teachers.390 This is an example of speech that actually caused a material
and substantial disruption, while the same speech that did not have this
effect probably would not, and thus would be subject to First Amendment
protection.391
Therefore, the reactions and offended feelings of a student or teacher
will not constitute a material and substantial disruption unless it can be
shown that there is severe physical or emotional harm endured that also
affected the school environment.392 The school administrators, or an
objective third party to the speech, will determine if the speech caused a
material and substantial disruption based on the facts and circumstances
of the situation.393 Trivial disruptions will not be within the realm of
authority to punish because there must be more than some mild
distraction or curiosity created by the speech to justify the school
abridging students’ First Amendment rights.394 While it is important for
under Tinker, a student’s off-campus speech must be sufficiently severe . . .”); see also supra Part
III.A (critiquing methods employed by courts that do not rely on the actual outcome of the speech,
but only the potential for a substantial disruption to occur).
388. See Willard, supra note 214, at 313 (providing examples of situations in which speech
would garner protection).
389. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d at 852.
390. Id. (“As a result of Mrs. Fulmer’s inability to return to work, three substitute teachers were
required to be utilized which disrupted the educational process of the students . . .”). For an analysis
of how students are affected by teachers’ absences, see Raegen T. Miller, Richard J. Murnane, &
John B. Willett, Do Teacher Absences Impact Student Achievement? Longitudinal Evidence from
One Urban School District 4–25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13356,
2007).
391. This example could be listed in the schools’ policy to further clarify what is within the
scope of authority and what is not. See Willard, supra note 12, at 625 (listing examples of other
instances that would cause a substantial and material disruption in a school).
392. This proposed approach is similar to the Ninth Circuit’s “faced with an identifiable threat
of school violence” approach. See supra Part III.A.4 (describing the approach taken by the Ninth
Circuit). See, e.g., Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding
that Tinker only applies when there is a threat of school violence).
393. It is important to note that school administrators may be the target of the speech, and as
such, disciplinary action may be made based on the subjective feelings of the administrator. If this
is the case, an objective third party must be brought in to determine whether the speech actually
caused a material and substantial disruption.
394. Under this approach, the social media posting in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board
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schools to provide examples of speech that are within their authority to
discipline, it is imperative to include in the policy the caveat that these
lists can never be exhaustive due to a constantly changing world.395
Schools must retain authority to react efficiently and maintain order in
the school environment when responding to a substantial and material
disruption stemming from social media conduct, and this language would
provide that authority.396
1. True Threat Exception
To protect the safety of the students and teachers and the general
welfare of the school, there must be an exception to the enhanced
substantial and material standard when the speech poses a threat of death
or serious bodily harm to a member of the school community.397 Instead
of waiting for the speech to cause an effect of significant magnitude,
administrators must be given the discretion to curtail and punish speech
that will potentially have serious consequences.398 Thus, threats made
toward a student or teacher will not be permitted under the proposed
school policy.399 Borrowing Justice O’Connor’s definition, a “true
threat” should be defined in school policies as statements “where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of intent to commit
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or a group of

would be outside the school’s authority to punish. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d
379, 383 (5th Cir. 2015) (upholding a student’s punishment despite a lack of evidence of a
substantial and material disruption); see also supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing
the speech at issue in Bell).
395. See Pottsville Social Media Policy, supra note 162 (denoting seven instances in which
“including, but not limited to” is written to expand the authority to punish speech that is not
included in these limited examples).
396. Calvert, supra note 254, at 251 (noting the need to balance schools’ interests and students’
rights). See also supra note 261 and accompanying text (comparing the interests of schools in cases
before the courts).
397. Hughes, supra note 143, at 229 (noting when speech contains a threat “then the student’s
First Amendment right to free speech does not come into play and schools can act quickly and
decisively to prevent any danger at school”). See generally supra Part I.C (discussing the “true
threat” test articulated by the Supreme Court).
398. Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that
administrators may curtail speech when it is likely to cause violence in the school). This exception
to the proposed standard allows administrators to react to a true threat when it is “reasonably
foreseeable” to cause a substantial disruption, borrowing the reasoning from the “reasonably
foreseeable” test and the “faced with an identifiable threat of violence” test. See supra Part III.A.1,
III.A.4 (discussing the approaches taken by the circuit courts from which this proposal borrows).
399. See Calvert, supra note 149, at 767 (discussing the interests a school has in protecting
students and teachers, noting “[s]chool administrators rightfully are concerned about stopping
violence on their campuses . . .”).
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individuals.”400 The intent prong of this definition is important.401 This
incorporates a portion of the test the Third Circuit uses to analyze offcampus speech, but tweaks it to focus on the intent to inflict harm, rather
than the intent to cause a disruption.402
To prove intent, school officials should have the authority to consider
the circumstances behind the speech, but place the safety and well-being
of the school community above the speech rights of the student.403 Thus,
when speech amounts to a true threat, school administrators will have the
authority to censor and punish this speech before it causes a material and
substantial disruption, regardless of whether such a disruption actually
occurs.404 If these elements are met, the school’s analysis is complete and
appropriate discipline may be imposed.405
This heightened substantial and material disruption standard
incorporates ideas that the federal appellate courts found important, but
does not reflect some of the threshold tests that serve to restrict students’
free speech rights.406 Moreover, it allows for use of the true threat
exception in order to prevent violence and maintain order in the schools,
while staying inside the realm of Packingham.407 Once a school finds that
400. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
401. Stanner, supra note 72, at 409–12 (arguing that in the justice system “intent” is necessary
to punish a student in a post-Columbine world, as it is often difficult to distinguish between jokes
and real threats).
402. See supra Part III.A.3 (analyzing the Third Circuit’s intent threshold to Tinker); see also
Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(placing special emphasis on the student’s intent in order to vacate his suspension).
403. The Supreme Court alluded to this premise in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, articulating
that state interests in morality and order outweigh the slight social value inherent in such violent
speech. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). But see Christi Cassel, Keep Out of MySpace!: Protecting
Students from Unconstitutional Suspensions and Expulsions, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 650
(2007) (noting that while schools should be concerned with safety, schools lack sufficient
guidelines regarding the appropriateness of discipline they impose relating to online speech,
resulting in decisions that may violate students’ First Amendment rights).
404. See supra note 398 and accompanying text (discussing that it must be reasonably
foreseeable that the threat will cause harm).
405. This Comment proposes a three-part test, but if the speech amounts to a true threat, the
third part does not have to be analyzed. See infra Part IV.C (discussing analysis of the intent of the
speaker through content and form to determine if the speech will be protected).
406. See supra Part III.A (analyzing the threshold tests incorporated in the proposal); supra Part
III.A.3 (discussing the “intent” approach taken by the Third Circuit, which is incorporated as an
element of this proposal); see also supra Part III.A.4 (analyzing the “faced with an identifiable
threat of violence” approach taken by the Ninth Circuit, which is also incorporated into this
proposal as an exception to the heightened material and substantial disruption test).
407. See supra Part IV.B.1 (proposing the “true threat” exception to the heightened material
and substantial disruption test). This proposal stays within the confines of Packingham because it
is not a blanket restriction on social media. Moreover, Packingham afforded the government the
authority to regulate online speech, so long as it survives intermediate scrutiny. Packingham v.
North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017).
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the social media speech caused a material and substantial disruption
within the scope of the proposed policy, the intent of the speaker must be
analyzed before disciplinary action is warranted.408
C. Determining the Intent of the Speaker Through Content and Form
The next part of the framework for determining whether off-campus
speech deserves First Amendment protection is to look at the intent of the
speaker.409 It is important to note that this intent analysis is different than
the intent threshold the Third Circuit uses because intent should be looked
at as intent to materially and substantially cause a disruption, not as intent
to reach the schoolhouse gate.410 Though difficult, determining a
speaker’s subjective intent is important, and there are factors to assist
administrators in determining the true intent behind the speech: content
and form.411
1. Content
Content-based restrictions have been looked upon with disfavor by the
Supreme Court and frequently fail to withstand strict scrutiny.412 On the
other hand, content-neutral restrictions are subject to intermediate
scrutiny and are more likely to survive judicial review.413 This proposal
recommends that school districts enact a content-based policy, but rather
than restrict specific content, allow it.414 Online speech created for the
408. See infra Part IV.C (proposing an additional layer to the student speech analysis).
409. See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing the Third Circuit approach, which serves as inspiration
for this prong of the proposal). “Intent” of the speaker is analyzed differently than the true threat
exception. See supra Part IV.B.1.
410. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (holding that because the student did not intend for his speech to reach the school, it is not
foreseeable that it would cause a substantial disruption). See generally Beatus, supra note 111
(discussing the approach taken by the Third Circuit).
411. In Texas v. Johnson, Justice Brennan discussed the importance of “intent” in First
Amendment analysis: “In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative
elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked whether an intent to convey a
particularized message was present and whether the likelihood was great that the message would
be understood by those who viewed it.” 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
412. See generally Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and
Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595 (2003) (providing a background
of content-neutral and content-based regulations and the implications resulting from these
restrictions). But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (noting “[c]ontent-based
regulations are presumptively invalid”).
413. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (stating “[R]egulations that are
unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny”) (citation
omitted). See also Jacobs, supra note 412, at 623, 626 (discussing intermediate scrutiny as a lower
threshold to analyze speech regulations).
414. Joseph Mead, The First Amendment Protection of Charitable Speech, 76 OHIO ST. L.J.
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purpose of advancing a political opinion, religious affiliation, social
ideology, or matter of public concern is consistently afforded First
Amendment protection.415 The Supreme Court held in Texas v. Johnson
that burning the American flag fits within First Amendment protection
because of the importance of free political expression, although the act is
offensive to many.416 Thus, no matter how offensive or what kind of
disruption the speech causes in the school, if it does not encompass a true
threat, then political, religious, or social speech may be afforded
protection.417 For example, a student’s post on her Facebook page stating
that the LGBTQ community should not be afforded special protection
would be protected speech, as it expresses a political ideology. 418 This
inverted content-based policy, allowing protections for historically
protected subject matter, is in accordance with Reno and Packingham.419
If the speech does not constitute political, religious, or other similarly
protected speech and it causes a substantial and material disruption, then
it will be subject to greater scrutiny. 420 While there will be no blanket
restrictions on any type of speech akin to Packingham, speech that might
otherwise seem protected that causes a material and substantial disruption

FURTHERMORE 57, 61 (2015) (stating “[w]hile a content-based panhandling law will not survive,
the inverse is not necessarily true”). See also Ashutosh Bhagwat, In Defense of Content Regulation,
102 IOWA L. REV. 1427, 1430 (2016) (arguing for courts to be less hostile to content-based
regulations, stating “the blanket assumption that all distinctions among categories of protected
speech are presumptively invalid must be abandoned”).
415. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995) (stating
“private religious speech . . . is fully protected under the Free Speech Clause . . .”); see also
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (holding that the government
may not restrict political speech).
416. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409 (1989) (providing First Amendment protection for political
speech, regardless of the offensive effect of the speech). See generally C. L. Welborn, Texas v.
Johnson: The United States Supreme Court Reaffirms the Very Principles of Freedom for which
the American Flag Stands, 64 TUL. L. REV. 265 (1989) (discussing the reasoning in Texas v.
Johnson).
417. In Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme Court addressed whether there is constitutional protection
for hateful military funeral protesters. 562 U.S. 443 (2011). In an 8-1 decision, Chief Justice
Roberts wrote the First Amendment protects this speech, however offensive, because “speech is
powerful” and protection is required of “even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do
not stifle public debate.” Id. at 460–61. See also Adam Liptak, Justices Rule for Protestors at
Military
Funerals,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
2,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/us/03scotus.html (discussing the reasoning and impact of
Snyder v. Phelps).
418. Phelps, 562 U.S. at 460–61 (stating “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open”) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
419. See Bhagwat, supra note 414, at 1430 (advocating for content-based restrictions to be
upheld in court); see also Mead, supra note 414, at 58 (arguing for content-based charitable speech
policies to be permissible).
420. See supra Part IV.B (proposing an enhanced material and substantial disruption standard).
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will be prohibited.421 For example, if a student encourages a senior prank
on his Facebook page, and that specific prank causes a material and
substantial disruption, the Facebook post will not be protected speech
even if the content is not illegal, lewd, or offensive. 422 But, if the same
student posts about a religious meeting to be held during lunch, and that
causes a material and substantial disruption due to offended students and
teachers, this type of speech would receive constitutional protection.423
Because the intent of the speaker in the senior prank example was to cause
a material and substantial disruption in the school, this speech will not be
protected.424 Conversely, the intent of the student holding the religious
meeting is to further a religious message rather than to cause harm, so the
speech will be protected.425
2. Form
The form in which the speech is written may further assist schools in
determining a student’s intent.426 Often, students use art as a way to
express themselves.427 Art forms such as songs, literature, poetry,
421. In Packingham v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court held that blanket restrictions on
social media cannot survive intermediate scrutiny nor strict scrutiny. 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736–37
(2017). Because this proposal is not a blanket restriction, as it does not prohibit use of social media
as a whole, it fits within the realm of protected Internet speech that Packingham intended to protect.
422. Compare Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding there is
no First Amendment protection for student speech that is lewd, sexually suggestive, and
inappropriate), and Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (holding the First Amendment
does not protect student speech which may reasonably be found to promote drug use or other illegal
activity), with Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50–51 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding speech that the
student intended to cause a substantial disruption is subject to discipline). The type of speech in
Doninger is akin to the type of speech this example intends to punish.
423. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (holding political speech is protected
regardless of the offended feelings it incurs); see also Phelps, 562 U.S. at 460–61 (holding religious
and social speech is protected to encourage debate).
424. In order for this speech to be subject to discipline, it still must actually cause a substantial
and material disruption. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the standard under which a substantial and
material disruption should be analyzed for non-threatening speech).
425. William A. Glaser, Worshipping Separation: Worship in Limited Public Forums and the
Establishment Clause, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1053, 1107 (stating “the Court has indicated that protecting
religious speech is the core concern of the Free Speech Clause”). As religious speech is consistently
protected, citizens have very passionate and differing views regarding religious affiliation. For a
look at the religious divide in the United States, see U.S. Religious Landscape Survey: Religious
Beliefs
and
Practices,
PEW
RESEARCH
CTR.
(June
1,
2008),
http://www.pewforum.org/2008/06/01/u-s-religious-landscape-survey-religious-beliefs-andpractices/ (providing statistics on the religious preferences of United States citizens).
426. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 409 (5th Cir. 2015) (Dennis, J., dissenting)
(“It is axiomatic that music, like other art forms, has historically functioned as a mechanism to raise
awareness of contemporary social issues.”). See also Landfried, supra note 131, at 216 (arguing for
a different standard to analyze off-campus student speech in which the court should look at the
form of the speech in its analysis).
427. Geri Spieler, Why the Arts Are Still Relevant: Creative Self Expression Matters Even More
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photographs, and film typically enjoy heightened First Amendment
protections.428 To ensure that this artistic expression is not curtailed,
school officials should afford greater leeway to speech that causes a
substantial and material disruption when it could be considered within
one of these forms of artistic expression.429 In contrast, a message or
simple post on social media will not be given the same heightened
protection as a poem or short film posted on social media.430 Still, the
school administrators must determine whether the speech is considered a
true threat and analyze the additional elements of this proposed test before
concluding the art form is protected.431 This proposal is not implying that
any speech that constitutes an art form is protected, but rather that greater
latitude should be given to expressive speech so as to encourage art in the
digital age.432
This proposal is a content-based regulation on speech because the
subject matter is at the heart of the analysis. 433 Similar to the Third Circuit
approach, the intent of the speaker is analyzed through the content and
form of the speech.434 Unlike the school policies analyzed in Part III, this
is an inverse content-based regulation, in that it affords heightened
Now, HUFFINGTON POST (July 27, 2017, 11:38 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/whythe-arts-are-still-relevant-creative-self-expression_us_597ab0b5e4b06b305561cf6d. See also
Daniel Mach, The Bold and the Beautiful: Art, Pubic Spaces, and the First Amendment, 72 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 383, 383 (1997) (advocating for First Amendment protection of art “[b]ecause art by its
very nature stimulates both intellectual and emotional responses, it is uniquely suited to generate
powerful, often conflicting reactions in both artist and viewer”).
428. Mach, supra note 427, at 387 (listing art forms that are subject to heightened First
Amendment protection).
429. See id. (discussing a variety of art forms that enjoy full First Amendment protection when
the artistic expression conveys a legitimate message); Landfried, supra note 131, at 214 (“To ensure
that artistic or therapeutic expression is not being constrained, latitude should be given to speech
which is in an artistic form.”).
430. The term “short film” as used here is not intended to encompass all YouTube or other
videos that are violent or cause a substantial disruption. But see supra notes 20 and 21 for a
circumstance in which a YouTube “short film” would be subject to heightened First Amendment
protection under this analysis (providing an example of a situation in which a student posted an
expressive video on YouTube to raise awareness of the harmful effects of bullying).
431. See supra Parts IV.A, B (discussing the “other elements” of this proposal necessary in
order to analyze whether speech should be subject to discipline).
432. See Landfried, supra note 131, at 214 (stating “[a] student who uses artistic expression as
a free pass to engage in inappropriate speech should not be afforded that opportunity”). Moreover,
a painting or a song that is a “true threat” will not be protected. See Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of
the Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that a drawing depicting
a teacher being shot is not protected speech).
433. See generally Jacobs, supra note 412 (providing a background on content-based
regulations). See supra Part II (discussing the Supreme Court’s take on content-based and contentneutral regulations).
434. See supra Part III.A.3 (arguing the Third Circuit’s context requirement serves a positive
purpose in light of students’ rights in the digital age and borrowing its approach).
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protection to political or religious speech regardless of the speech’s
disruption in school.435 These additional protections serve the purpose of
the First Amendment and combat the “chilling effect” on free speech.436
Moreover, it allows school officials the authority to discipline students
for social media postings when the speaker intended to cause a substantial
and material disruption in the school.437 This proposal successfully
balances students’ First Amendment rights with the compelling and
important interest of schools by incorporating elements of the federal
appellate courts’ approaches while staying within the holdings and
scrutiny applied in Reno and Packigham.438
CONCLUSION
The Internet and social media have become one of the most important,
if not the most important, places for people to express themselves and
engage in protected First Amendment activities. As technology continues
to improve, it will only serve to expand and enhance the ways in which
people—and especially students—engage and communicate. Because the
Supreme Court has not provided insight on the issue of off-campus
student speech, the lower courts are tasked with articulating tests and
thresholds to determine the limits of schools’ authority to discipline such
speech. As a result, the federal appellate courts have distorted the
framework of Tinker and applied their own inconsistent analyses, leading
to unpredictable First Amendment protection for students.
Due to the inconsistency between and overbroad tests pronounced by
the circuit courts, school districts must be the ones to address these issues
and create social media policies that balance the First Amendment rights
of students and the need for administrators to maintain authority and
order in schools. The Supreme Court’s holding in Packingham should
435. Compare Part III.B (analyzing the constitutionality of three schools’ social media policies),
with Part IV (proposing a standard for schools to follow when crafting social media policies). See
also Welborn, supra note 416, at 270 (discussing the importance of protecting speech that advances
a political viewpoint).
436. Rudolph, supra note 323, at 187–88 (arguing for policies restricting social media to be
specific so students know when their speech will be protected and when it will not be protected).
See generally supra Part III.C (discussing the chilling effect on student speech).
437. Hughes, supra note 143, at 214 (discussing the need for a test to analyze off-campus
student speech that balances students’ First Amendment rights with administrators’ authority to
discipline harmful speech); see also Landfried, supra note 131, at 218–19 (arguing “[a] clear
standard is needed now more than ever, to balance the necessity of keeping schools safe and the
rights of students to freely express themselves once they exit the schoolhouse gates”).
438. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to a content-neutral regulation, balancing the government’s interest with sex offenders’
right to free speech); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (applying strict
scrutiny to a content-based restriction, balancing the government’s interest with the right to free
speech).
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guide these schools when crafting social media policies, but it will not be
an easy task. Creating a policy that encompasses all situations and
provides guidance for every possibility is difficult, but by carefully
drafting a policy and defining the limitations on speech, schools can
achieve some much needed clarity while they wait for the Supreme Court
to address this issue.

